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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the profitability of Russian banking M&A and the relationship 
between ownership structure and post acquisition performance. Previous studies on profitability of 
banking M&A have focused mostly on U.S. and Western Europe. This thesis contributes to previous 
research by focusing on relative under-researched Russian banking sector. 
 
The sample of this study includes 20 M&A announcements from Russian banks between the years 2005 
and 2013. Event study methodology is used to investigate the market reactions following M&A 
announcements. Abnormal returns are calculated for 21-day long event window, starting 10 days prior the 
acquisition announcement and ending 10 days after the announcement. After the abnormal returns have 
been calculated, OLS regressions are used to investigate the factors explaining M&A success. 3-day 
cumulative abnormal return of the bidding bank is the dependent variable in all regressions. In addition, 
regression models include different ownership structure variables and a set of control variables. 
 
Results suggest that abnormal returns for bidding banks around M&A announcements are moderately 
positive but statistically insignificant. Owning a stake of the target prior acquisition has a positive impact 
on post acquisition performance. Additionally, private ownership and geographic scope of the deal have a 
positive impact on post acquisition performance. The impact of ownership concentration and state 
ownership on post acquisition performance are found to be statistically insignificant. Finally, bank 
specific variables explain part of the variation in cumulative abnormal returns. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the past few years the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) industry has been 
booming. Deal volumes and aggregate value of disclosed deals have reached new 
records quarter by quarter. In 2015 total value of M&A reached to 4,7 trillion dollars, 
topping the previous record of the year 2007. Following the record year of 2015 total 
value of global M&A remained high at 3,9 trillion dollars in 2016. Some of the key 
factors that have driven M&A in recent years are improving economy, low interest rates 
and cash-heavy balance sheets.  Analysts believe that M&A activity will remain high, as 
companies continue to seek synergies and growth opportunities through mergers and 
acquisitions. (KPMG 2016.) 
 
Several companies mention M&A as their main tool for growth and success. Economic 
theory provides different explanations on the question what drives M&A. Common 
reasons to conduct M&A are related to efficiency improving aims. M&A is done to 
create economics of scope, synergies and greater efficiency to asset management. Other 
explanations consist of attempts to gain more market power by acquiring competitors, 
and market discipline in the case of removing the incapable management of the target 
company. However, evidence also exists that mergers and acquisitions may be 
consequence of harmful empire building by managers. So it seems that merger and 
acquisitions may also be carried out from personal reasons, and not only by the aims to 
maximize shareholders wealth. (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford 2001.) 
 
This study investigates the profitability banking M&A in Russia and the relationship 
between ownership structure and post acquisition performance of acquiring firms. 
Research is aimed at Russian banking sector where ownership concentration is really 
common. In addition, Russian government is holding a majority stake in five of the 
largest banks in Russia. Besides to unique ownership structures and governments active 
role in financial markets, recent financial crisis in Russia has increased consolidation 
pressure in the Russian banking sector. Increasing interest rates and sanctions laid from 
the conflict with Ukraine have hurt Russian banks. The crisis have wounded especially 
weaker lenders and made them as potential targets for large and mid-sized banks. In 
addition to recent crisis in banking sector, Central Bank of Russia has recently 
implemented stricter financial standards and increased minimum capital requirements. 
Reforms have wounded especially smaller weakly government banks and led to 
situation, where number of operating banks is shrinking at a rapid pace. These recent 
developments in Russian banking sector make this research topical. Moreover, the 
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unique ownership structure of the Russian banks create interesting setting to study the 
impact of ownership concentration on post acquisition performance.  
 
Numerous studies have analyzed the profitability and factors that drive M&A success or 
failure. Most of these studies focus on measuring daily returns around the 
announcement date. Majority of the previous studies conclude that abnormal returns 
around announcement date are zero or negative for acquirers and positive for targets 
(Spyrou & Siougle 2010; Campa & Hernando 2006). However, some studies find 
contradictory results indicating that both targets and acquirers earn positive and 
statistically significant abnormal returns (Cybo-Ottone & Muriga 2000). Previous 
studies on the profitability of banking M&A focus mostly on U.S. and Western Europe. 
Since majority of previous studies have focused on U.S. and Western Europe markets, 
M&A research in emerging markets is still limited. Russian banking sector has 
developed quickly after the banking crisis of 1998. Additionally, the differences in legal 
and institutional frameworks and relative low level of corporate governance in 
comparison to Western developed nations create interesting settings for this study. To 
my knowledge this is the first study that investigate the relationship between ownership 
structure and post-acquisition performance in Russian banking sector.  
 
Even though previous literature on the factors driving M&A success is extensive, only a 
few of the previous studies analyze the relationship between ownership structure and 
post-acquisition performance. Yen & André (2007) study the relationship between 
ownership structure and long-term operating performance of acquiring firms. Yen & 
André (2007) argue that acquisitions may raise agency problems when different 
shareholder groups have divergent opinions on company’s strategy. These problems 
may increase agency costs and lead to worse post acquisition performance. On the 
contrary, ownership concentration should lead to decreasing agency costs and therefore 
better post-acquisition performance. Yen & André (2007) study the relationship 
between ownership concentration and post-acquisition performance taking a long-term 
perspective by focusing on changes in operating cash flow returns after the acquisitions. 
Findings of the study suggest that the relationship between ownership concentration and 
changes in operating cash flows after acquisition is non-linear. Value increasing deals 
are associated with higher ownership concentration persistent with decreasing agency 
costs as the majority shareholders money invested in the acquiring firm increases. 
Researchers also find that separation of ownership and voting-rights is associated with 
greater value destruction, and that greater investor protection has a positive impact on 
abnormal returns.  
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Ben-Amar & André (2006) study the relationship between ownership structure and 
acquiring firm abnormal returns using a sample of 327 Canadian acquisitions. Family 
owners control large proportion of the Canadian public companies by the use of 
majority voting rights, while at the same time they are holding only small fraction of 
cash flow rights. This control is gained by the use of dual-class shares and stock 
pyramids. This kind of ownership structures are proposed to lead higher agency costs 
than those appointed by more dispersed voting rights. However, Ben-Amar & André 
(2006) did not find any evidence that the separation of ownership from control would 
lead to value destruction. They also find that acquiring firm announcement period 
abnormal returns are positive on average, and that these returns are higher for family 
owned firms. In light of these findings it is interesting to study the relationship between 
ownership concentration and post-acquisition performance in the Russian banking 
sector where ownership concentration is rather common. 
 
This thesis contributes to previous literature by studying post-acquisition performance 
in relative under-research Russian banking sector. This research is topical due to recent 
developments in the Russian banking sector. Russian economy has transformed from 
centrally planned to capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, state 
influence is still strong in the Russian banking sector and ownership concentration is at 
high levels. These features create unique settings for this study. Findings of this study 
should provide insightful evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and 
post-acquisition performance in the Russian banking sector. Findings of this study 
should also yield useful implications for the other emerging markets having similar 
ownership structures than those in Russia. 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate profitability of Russian banking M&A and to 
analyze the relationship between ownership structure and post acquisition performance. 
More precisely, this thesis investigates whether ownership concentration lead to better 
post acquisition performance, does holding a stake of the target prior the acquisition 
increase post acquisition performance and what is the impact of state ownership on post 
acquisition performance. 
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Research is aimed at Russian banking sector, where ownership concentration and state 
participation to financial markets is very common. These features make Russian market 
ideal field for this study. Although global M&A activity has been at record levels in 
recent years, Russian M&A market has been struggling. Aggregate value of disclosed 
deals in 2015 was the lowest in more than a decade. Decrease in M&A activity was 
driven by the economic downturn, falling oil price and constrained access to finance. 
However, at the same time these features create pressure for future consolidation in 
Russian banking sector. Because of these recent developments it is relevant to study 
short-term profitability and value drivers behind past M&A deals in Russian banking 
sector. 
 
 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter one introduces the research topic and its 
relevance. The second chapter provides an overlook on the Russian banking sector. The 
third chapter reviews relevant previous research on the profitability of mergers and 
acquisitions. Fourth chapter discusses relevant theories related to mergers and 
acquisitions. Following that research hypotheses, data and methodology used in this 
study are introduced in the chapter five. Sixth chapter presents the empirical findings of 
the study. Finally chapter seven concludes and introduces possible ideas for further 
research. 
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2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS OF THE RUSSIAN BANKING 
SECTOR 
 
Russian financial system started to develop after the collapse of Soviet Union.  
Privatization and legal liberalization were the main forces transforming Russian 
economy from centrally planned to market economy. This development was hit by the 
1998 Ruble crisis, which led to devaluating of the ruble and governments default on 
domestic debt. Although the crisis led to increasing inflation, interest rates and closed 
down large number of Russian banks, it had also positive impact to the development of 
Russian financial markets. Several institutional reforms were put in place aftermath the 
crisis, which led to fast development of the Russian banking sector and capital markets. 
 
The number of commercial banks has been traditionally relatively high in Russia. In 
2000 there were more than 1300 commercial banks in Russia, large part of these banks 
were miniscule and had little or no exposure to interbank markets. Since 2000 the 
number of operating banks in Russia has decreased with an increasing pace. This trend 
has been driven by actions of Central bank of Russia (CBR). In order to create better 
infrastructure into financial markets, CBR has implemented stricter financial standards 
and increased minimum capital requirements. These actions have decreased the number 
of operating banks in Russia significantly, from 923 at the start of year 2014 to only 623 
at the end of year 2016. (Central Bank of Russia 2017) 
 
Most of the vanished banks were small, but over the last few years also few of the banks 
among the largest hundred have lost their licenses. In addition to increasing minimum 
capital requirements and stricter regulation, the number of commercial banks in Russia 
has decreased through revocation of banking licenses. When Elvira Nabiullina took over 
the job as governor of the CBR in 2013 she had two main goals, one was to lower the 
inflation, and the second was to clean up the banking sector. Nabiullina have made 
progress in both of she’s targets. Under the command of Nabiullina CBR has revoked 
several banking licenses from banks that could not comply with new sticker standards. 
Tightening regulation may also create M&A opportunities into Russian banking sector, 
as banks that cannot comply with new regulations could become potential targets for 
bigger and better governed banks. However, although reforms imposed by CBR has 
significantly increased the health of the Russian banking sector they have not yet 
translated into increasing M&A activity in banking sector. (Central Bank of Russia 
2017; Solanko 2017) 
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Figure 1. Number of credit institutions in Russia. 
 
 
Figure 1 above illustrates how the number of credit institutions in Russia has decreased 
during the last ten years. The pace has picked up in recent years, due to the increasing 
regulation and recent banking license revocations. Although the number of commercial 
banks has been traditionally relatively high in Russia, banking sector has always been 
highly concentrated and dominated by state-owned banks. Mamonov & Vernikov 
(2017) argue that Russia stands out as special case among transition countries in terms 
of the role and importance of public banks. While the importance of public banks in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have almost gone extinct, those banks are still 
dominating the Russian market. Public banks held still approximately 60% market share 
in Russia, while market share of foreign banks is only close to 10%.  
 
Banking sector concentration is clearly seen when looking at total assets. According to 
CBR 2017 top five banks held more than 55% of the total assets in Russian banking 
industry, while top 20 account close to 80% as the end of the year 2017. All of the five 
largest banks in Russia are either fully or partially owned by government. Moreover, 
large state-owned corporations are among the largest depositors in Russian banking 
system. These facts illustrate that government’s influence in Russian banking sector is 
still strong and coming through different channels. High concentration and governments 
major role in banking sector may not be ideal for banking sector competition and 
efficiency. Previous research on banking efficiency in transition countries illustrate that 
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state-owned banks are less efficient than foreign and privately owned banks (Bonin, 
Hasan & Wactel 2005; Fries, Neven, Seabright & Taci 2006). Fungáčová & Poghosyan 
(2011) analyze the determinants of interest rate margins in Russian banking sector 
between the years 1999 – 2007, and find that even thought large state-owned banks are 
dominating the Russian banking sector the average net interest margins charged by 
state-controlled and privately held banks do not differs drastically. So it seems that 
state-controlled Russian banks are not fully exploiting their market power as they are 
setting the interest rates.  
 
 
Table 1. General information on the Russian banking sector.  
Table presents an overview on the main financial characteristics and recent developments of the Russian 
banking sector. Data is obtained from the reports of Central bank of Russia. 
 
General information on the Russian banking sector 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
            
Banking sector total assets, (billion rubles) 49509,6 57423,1 77653,0 82999,7 80063,3 
Change, %   15,98% 35,23% 6,89% -3,54% 
            
Banking sector total capital, (billion rubles) 6112,9 7064,3 7928,4 9008,6 9387,1 
Change, %   15,56% 12,23% 13,62% 4,20% 
            
Banking sector total loans to non-financial organizations and 
individuals, (billion rubles) 
27708,5 32456,3 40865,5 43985,2 40938,6 
          
Change, %   17,13% 25,91% 7,63% -6,93% 
            
 
 
Table 1 reports an overview on recent developments of the Russian banking sector. As 
we can see from the table, Russian banking sector has experienced rapid growth during 
the last five years. Banking sector total asset has by increased by 61,71 % from 2013 to 
2017. Similar growth can be observed when looking at the capital side, as banking 
sector total capital has increased by 53,56 % during the same time span. In addition, 
bank total lending to non-financial households and individuals has increased by 47,45%.   
 
Even thought Russian banking sector has grown fast during the last decade, the banking 
sector is still dominated by large state-owned banks. Market share of foreign banks is 
still relatively low when compared to other CEE economies. Increasing regulation and 
tightening minimum capital requirements create challenges for the Russian banks. At 
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the same time these recent developments of the Russian banking sector create 
interesting settings to study the relationship between ownership structures and post 
acquisition performance in Russian banking sector. 
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3. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
M&A profitability is one of the most studied areas in finance research. Most of the 
previous studies measuring M&A performance focus on measuring short-term wealth 
effects of M&A using daily stock prices around the announcement date. Among with 
the profitability of M&A transactions the value drivers behind these transactions are 
broadly studied. First studies on M&A profitability were conducted in U.S. markets. 
Later on studies have been made in Western European markets and recently some 
studies on M&A profitability have been conducted in emerging markets. This section 
provides extensive review on previous literature concerning short-term profitability of 
M&A. First I will focus on studies covering M&A profitability and factors behind 
M&A success across different industries. Since the focus of this study is on post 
acquisition performance in banking sector, previous studies on banking M&A will be 
reviewed on a separate section. 
 
 
3.1. M&A profitability across different industries 
 
Limmack (1991) analyze shareholder wealth effects of M&As in UK using data from 
1977 to 1986. Previous studies of wealth effects focus mostly on bid announcement 
date. This study makes an exception and analyzes returns around bid announcement and 
outcome date. Limmack (1991) suggest that this kind of methodology will capture the 
wealth effects of acquisitions more completely. Event study methodology is used and 
abnormal returns are calculated around two different event days: announcement day and 
the outcome day. Study utilizes three different models to calculate the wealth effects 
following M&A: market model, adjusted beta model and index-relative model. Findings 
of the study indicate that target company’s shareholders gain significantly from the bids 
in pre-merger period, and bidder company´s shareholders do not lose. When the 
analysis is extended to post-merger period, bidder company’s shareholders suffer losses. 
Limmack (1991) study also the net-wealth effects of takeovers, and conclude that 
takeovers do not cause net-wealth effects as gains obtained by target company’s 
shareholders are at the expense of bidder company’s shareholders. 
 
Andrade et al. (2001) argue that the most statistically reliable evidence on M&A value 
creation comes from a short-window event studies. Using an extensive sample of 3688 
completed mergers between the years 1973 and 1997 researchers show how abnormal 
returns are distributed between bidders and targets. Abnormal returns are on average 
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1,8% for the bidders and targets combined. Returns are quite similar across decades 
ranging from 1,4% to 2,6% for the combined entity. Differences in returns between 
decades are not statistically significant. Looking at the acquirer and target returns 
separately, it is clear that the target firm shareholders are major winners in M&A 
transactions, earning statistically significant 16% average abnormal return over the 
sample period. Evidence on value creation for bidder firm shareholders is ambiguous as 
they earn -0,7% statistically insignificant average abnormal return over the sample 
period. Andrade et al. (2001) also show that all-equity financed bids lead to lower 
returns than all-cash financed bids and reports clustering of takeover activity by 
industry during the fourth and the fifth takeover wave. This clustering is driven by 
different shocks such as deregulation, changes in oil prices and financial innovation. 
 
Goergen & Renneboog (2004) analyze short-term wealth effects of large intra-European 
takeover bids over the period of 1993–2000. Since most of the previous studies were 
performed in US market, Goergen & Renneboog (2004) suggest that European wide 
study would result in interesting results. After a careful sample selection final sample 
include 228 merger or acquisition announcements. Event study methodology is used to 
study short-term wealth effects of acquisitions. In order to capture possible effects of 
rumors and inside trading, event window starts six months before the bid announcement 
date. Researchers find 9% announcement effect for target firms. Positive announcement 
effects is found also for bidders, but with a way smaller magnitude of 0,7%. Goergen & 
Renneboog (2004) argue that the status of takeover bid has a huge impact on the 
abnormal returns. Hostile takeovers yield in 12,6% announcement effect for target firms 
compared to 8% announcement effect of mergers and friendly takeovers. The method of 
payment is find to have an impact on value creation, as all-cash offers results in 
substantially higher abnormal returns than all-equity or combined offers. 
 
Kiymaz & Baker (2008) examine short-term announcement effects of the largest 
domestic M&A deals in U.S. from 1989 to 2003 using standard event study 
methodology. Overall their results are similar than in previous studies suggesting that 
abnormal returns are negative and significant for bidders, but significantly positive for 
targets. However, not all the industries are same as abnormal returns varies from 
significantly positive to significantly negative across different industries. In addition to 
short-term wealth effects Kiymaz & Baker (2008) investigate the determinants of short-
term returns and the motives behind M&A transactions. Findings of the study suggest 
that synergy was the main motive for large U.S. M&A between the years 1989 and 
2003. Some support is also found for managerial hubris hypothesis. When analyzing the 
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determinants of abnormal returns, authors find that financial slack and P/E of the bidder 
are negatively related to abnormal returns. On the contrary positive relation exist 
between industry PE, operating in a heavily regulated industry and the form of payment. 
 
Arik & Kutan (2015) study the wealth effects of 1648 M&A announcements in 20 
emerging markets from 1997 to 2013. Consistent with previous literature from 
developed markets, scholars find positive announcement effect for targets over different 
event windows. However, abnormal returns are smaller in developing markets when 
compared to returns on developed markets. Arik & Kutan (2015) also study the factors 
driving abnormal returns and conclude that cash financed deals results in significantly 
higher returns than deals financed with equity or deals financed with both cash and 
equity. Relative size of acquirer in respect to target has also positive impact on 
abnormal returns. In conflict with previous research, a negative relation was found from 
the target firm being in heavily regulated industry. Finally authors conclude that 
abnormal returns have been higher after the financial crisis. Most of the findings of Arik 
& Kutan (2015) are in line with the previous studies from the developed markets. Even 
so, some of the findings are opposite to previous literature suggesting that there is room 
for further research concerning wealth effects following acquisitions in emerging 
markets. 
 
Numerous studies find that share price reactions for target firm shareholders are not 
only limited to announcement day but also start to build up prior the acquisition. 
Schwert (1996) find that share price reactions for target firms starts to build up 42 days 
prior the public announcement of the acquisition and accounts approximately 57% of 
the total premium paid by acquirer. This price run-up implies that the market is 
anticipating takeover bids. Price run-up is cost for the bidder and may be caused by 
rumors, information leakages or inside trading.  Brigida & Madura (2012) investigate 
sources of stock price run-up prior acquisitions in U.S. between the years 1995 and 
2007 arguing that anticipation of acquisition announcements drives informed trading, 
which in turn can lead to high run-up of target price before the announcement.  Findings 
of the study suggest that target stock price run-up depends on several bidder and target 
characteristics, which lead to private information leakages. Price run-up is higher when 
the bidder is not a private equity firm, is friendly, is foreign, or borrows to finance its 
acquisition. Price run-up depends also on target characteristics and is higher when target 
is smaller, have listed stock options and operates in technology sector. Brigida & 
Madura (2012) finds also that price run-up has decreased significantly after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was put in practice. This finding suggests that striker reporting 
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requirements and generally heightened regulatory environment has decreased price run-
ups. 
 
There are few previous studies investigating whether controlling shareholders create or 
destroy value in the context of acquisitions. Ben-Amar & André (2006) study the 
relationship between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance using a 
sample of 327 Canadian acquisitions. Family owners control large proportion of the 
Canadian public companies by the use of majority voting rights, while at the same time 
they are holding only small fraction of cash flow rights. This control is gained by the 
use of dual-class shares and stock pyramids. These kinds of ownership structures are 
proposed to lead higher agency costs than those appointed by more dispersed ownership 
structures. However, Ben-Amar & André (2006) did not find any evidence that 
separation of ownership and control would lead to value destruction. Authors also find 
that acquiring firm announcement period abnormal returns are positive on average and 
that these returns are higher for family owned firms.  
 
Ownership concentration is more common in emerging markets than in developed 
markets. This concentration is often achieved by family or state-ownership and by the 
use stock pyramids, cross-shareholdings, and dual class shares (La Porta, Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny 1999). In light of these findings Bhaumik & Selarka (2013) 
investigate whether ownership concentration improve M&A outcomes in emerging 
markets. Authors argue that most M&A fail because of agency conflicts, and that 
ownership concentration should reduce agency conflicts leading to better post 
acquisition performance. Analysis is done in Indian market where ownership 
concentration is common among families and business groups. Using a firm level data 
from 1995 to 2004 scholars find that post acquisition performance of acquiring firm is 
positively correlated with the degree of ownership concentration among its directors.  
Findings of the study indicate also that ownership concentration among foreign 
promoters enchanted post acquisition performance from 2001 to 2004. Bhaumik & 
Selarka (2013) note that although ownership concentration may reduce agency conflicts 
between managers and owners, it may increase agency conflicts between majority and 
minority shareholders. Minority expropriation may occur especially in emerging 
markets where in general standards for corporate governance are lower than in 
developed markets. 
 
Du & Boateng (2014) examine how state ownership and institutional factors affect 
value creation in M&A using a sample of 468 cross-border M&A announcements by 
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Chinese listed firms. They find bidder gains ranging from 0.47% to 1.52% over the 10-
day event window. Findings indicate that state ownership has positive and significant 
impact on announcement period abnormal returns, suggesting that government has 
major impact on M&A value creation in China. Du & Boateng (2014) argue that state 
ownership signals that Chinese government is committed to developing these 
companies. Furthermore, Chinese firms with state ownership benefits from political ties 
with the government and preferential access to resources. On the contrary Bertrand & 
Betschinger (2012) argue that state lead acquisitions can lead to worse post acquisition 
performance due to lower internal efficiency and conflicts between political aims and 
profit objectives. Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) study the long-run operating 
performance of acquiring firms and find that state ownership has a negative impact on 
post-acquisition profitability. In light of these findings, it is interesting to study the 
relationship between state ownership and acquirer returns in Russia. 
 
In addition to ownership structure corporate governance has an impact on stock prices 
and acquirer returns. Level of corporate governance varies around the world, and in 
general standards for corporate governance are higher in Western countries than in 
Eastern Europe and Asia. Gompers, Ishii & Metric (2003) investigate the relation 
between corporate governance and equity prices. They construct “Governance Index” to 
measure the balance of power between managers and shareholders. Using this index 
authors build different portfolios to measure the effect of corporate governance on firm 
value and long-run stock performance. Authors find that antitakeover provisions (ATPs) 
have a negative impact on stock prices and long-run stock performance. Masulis, Wang 
& Xie (2007) further continued Gompers et al. (2003) work and studied the relationship 
between corporate governance and acquirer returns. Researchers find, that acquirers 
with more ATPs earn significantly lower announcement period abnormal returns. 
Masulis et al. (2007) results support the hypothesis that managers at firms applying 
more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the power of the market for corporate 
control, and therefore are more likely to commit shareholder value destructing empire-
building acquisitions.  Kim & Lu (2013) study how corporate governance reforms 
undertaken by 26 developed and emerging countries over the years 1991 and 2007 have 
affected on M&A decisions. Corporate governance reforms have an impact on investor 
protection, thus an increase or decrease in corporate governance has an effect on the gap 
of investor protection between bidder and target countries. Changes in this gap are 
found to have an effect acquirer’s tendency to pick better performing firms in countries 
that have lower level of corporate governance. Kim and Lu (2013) findings show the 
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importance of corporate governance reforms and imply that the level of investor 
protection has an effect to capital flows between developed and developing countries.  
 
 
3.2. Profitability of banking M&A 
 
Literature investigating the effects and motives of banking M&A is extensive. Bank 
consolidation has been ongoing since 1980s, and is expected to continue further, as 
banks are re-structuring to respond in changing regulation, technological innovations 
and crisis that shake up our financial system. The number of operating banks has 
decreased significantly over the past two decades and typical bank is now larger, more 
diversified and operates in more markets than ever before. This consolidation wave has 
produced bulk of literature studying the wealth effects, motives and how does re-
structuring affect on banks risk levels. Most of the studies measuring the wealth effects 
of banking M&A employ the traditional event-study methodology. This approach is 
typically two staged, at first the excess returns of these transactions are calculated, and 
following that excess returns are regressed to a set of control variables.  
 
First studies on the profitability of banking M&A were conducted in U.S. during 1980s 
and 1990s. Findings of these studies are on line with previous studies measuring post 
acquisition performance across different industries, indicating that on average target 
firm shareholders earn positive abnormal returns, bidder firm shareholders earn zero or 
negative returns and abnormal returns for combined firm shareholders are statistically 
insignificant (Houston & Ryngaert 1994; Hudgins & Seifert 1996). Later on scholars 
have been focusing on post acquisition performance in Europe as well. Cybo-Ottone & 
Murgia (2000) study the short-term wealth effects of M&A in European banking 
industry. Using a sample of 54 European M&A from 1988 to 1997 they find positive 
and significant abnormal returns for both bidders and targets over short event windows. 
Authors also show that country effects do not drive results, suggesting that stock market 
valuation and institutional frameworks are relative homogeneous across Europe. Cybo-
Ottone & Murgia (2000) argue also that difference in their findings compared to 
previous research from U.S. arise from differences in market structures and regulation 
regimes between these two markets. 
 
Beitel, Schiereck & Wahrenburg (2004) examine 98 large European banking M&As 
from 1985 to 2000 to identify the factors driving abnormal returns. They analyze 13 
different variables that have been found to cause excess returns in previous studies. 
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Using multivariate cross-sectional regressions and comparative statistics with mean 
difference tests, scholars find that many of these factors affect stock returns. Findings of 
the study suggest that the stock market reaction to M&A announcements can be at least 
partially estimated. Overall Beitel et al. (2004) find positive abnormal returns for targets 
and combined firm shareholders.  More precisely, findings of the study indicate that 
bidding banks are more successful when they acquire smaller and faster growing targets 
that have relatively low efficiency measures, and when they engage in fewer M&A 
transactions. 
 
Campa & Hernando (2006) study a European sample of 244 M&As from financial 
industry between the years 1998 and 2002. In addition to short-term wealth effects of 
these transactions, they focus on pre- and post merger profits and efficiency. Results 
from the event study are in line with the previous literature, as they find positive and 
significant short-term returns for target firm shareholders around the announcement day, 
while returns for bidding firm shareholders are slightly negative. Most of the excess 
returns is realized during a short window around the announcement. One year after the 
announcement average excess returns for both bidders and targets are statistically 
insignificant.  Campa & Hernando (2006) find also that the efficiency of target banks 
measured by return on equity improves significantly after the M&A transactions, and 
that domestic transactions yield relatively better returns for acquirers than cross-border 
transactions. Another interesting study is the research by Ekkayokkya, Holmes & 
Paudyal (2009) who study whether the move towards, and eventual adoption, of euro 
have an impact on bidding banks shareholders announcement period abnormal returns. 
Researchers study abnormal returns from 1990 to 2004 and compare abnormal returns 
in three different sub-periods: pre-euro, run-up to the euro and post euro eras. Findings 
of the study show that bidder gains have decreased after the introduction of the euro. 
This implies that financial integration has increased competition for corporate control, 
which has decreased bidders gains from acquisitions. Results also show that 
diversifying deals are value enhancing during all tree sub-periods, while focused deals 
have lead to statistically significant losses after the introduction of the euro. This 
suggests that the level of market integration is still sector dependent. 
 
More recently Nnadi & Tanna (2013) analyze wealth effects of 62 European banking 
mega-mergers from 1997 to 2007. Mega-mergers are classified as deals valued over 1 
billion dollars. Researchers focus on differences in announcement period abnormal 
returns between domestic and cross-border deals. Instead of using cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) as a measure of wealth creation, authors employ standardized 
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cumulative abnormal returns (SCARs) in their analysis. The purpose of standardizing is 
to make sure that every abnormal return has the same variance, and to ensure that results 
are not driven by single events. Findings of the study indicate that domestic transactions 
results in higher announcement period abnormal returns than cross-border acquisitions. 
This is consistent with previous research by (Cybo-Ottone & Murgia 2000; Beital et al, 
2004; Campa & Hernando 2004). Yet, the abnormal returns for acquirers are 
significantly negative in cross-border deals, while abnormal returns in domestic deals 
are positive but statistically insignificant. Thus, the results of Nnadi & Tanna (2013) 
suggest that banking M&A do not create value for acquiring firm shareholders.  
 
Banking consolidation has been very active in Europe during the last few decades. This 
consolidation has created chunk of literature presented above (Cybo-Ottone & Murgia 
2000; Beital et al, 2004; Campa & Hernando 2004; Nnadi & Tanna 2013). However, the 
financial crisis between the years 2007 and 2009 creates interesting setting to study, if 
M&A returns are somehow different during the crisis. Beltratti & Paladino (2013) 
address this this issue by studying a sample of 131 completed and 8 terminated deals 
from the European financial industry in 2007 – 2010. Researchers argue that crisis may 
create opportunity for healthy banks to increase their market share and profitability, by 
acquiring weaker banks at distressed prices. This study makes an exception to previous 
studies, by studying abnormal returns in two different event windows. Returns are 
calculated around the announcement and completion date of the acquisition. This is 
motivated by the fact that during the crisis due diligence process carried out by the 
acquirers may reveal valuable information on target banks assets. Therefore, the 
completion of due diligence process removes uncertainty and should reveal value 
relevant information. Findings of Beltratti & Paladino (2013 suggest that abnormal 
returns for acquirers are zero on average after the announcements, but positive after the 
deal completion. Bank characteristics seem to explain abnormal returns, as returns are 
higher for more profitable and efficient banks and for banks with less leverage. In 
contrast to previous studies idiosyncratic volatility does not explaining post acquisition 
returns. The impact of method of is exact opposite during the crisis than in normal 
times, as cash payments result in lower abnormal returns than equity payments. Overall 
authors suggest that M&A is indeed different during crisis. Investors assign significant 
uncertainty for the competition of M&A transactions during crisis, and reward 
successful deals with delayed abnormal returns.  
 
Recent research by Kyriazopoulos & Drymbetas (2015) study whether domestic M&A 
still create value. Although cross-border acquisitions became increasingly popular in 
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mid 90´s, the ratio of domestic M&As to cross-boarder M&As has steadily been around 
five to one. Thus, researchers argue that studying a fresh sample of domestic 
transactions would result in useful findings.  Using an extensive sample of 118 domestic 
M&As from 1996 to 2010 Kyriazopoulos & Drymbetas (2015) find that domestic 
acquisitions still create value for target bank shareholders. Consistent with previous 
literature abnormal returns around announcement date for bidding banks shareholder are 
close to zero and statistically insignificant. Authors focus explicitly on the profitability 
of both involved parties, and state that prior profitability explains short-term excess 
returns for both acquirers and targets. Findings of the study suggest also that, 
information leakages prior acquisitions are minimal and that excess returns vanish 
shortly after the acquisition.  
 
Since abnormal returns have been slightly different in Europe and U.S., researchers 
have tried to identify the country specific factors that drive M&A returns. Hagendorff, 
Collins & Keasey (2008) compare shareholder wealth effects of large bank M&A 
between Europe and U.S. Authors argue that differences in announcement period excess 
returns between U.S. and Europe are mostly driven by the differences in investor 
protection between these two countries. This argument is confirmed by the findings of 
the study, which indicate that there is inverse relationship between the level of investor 
protection and bidding bank announcement period abnormal returns. Abnormal returns 
are higher when bidders acquire banks in relatively low investor protection regimes, 
which is mostly in Europe. Findings of the study indicate that markets assume that 
acquirers can create economic gains from targets in relatively low investor protection 
environment. On the contrary, in high investor protection environment where 
competition for corporate control is higher, it is difficult for bidders to realize any 
merger related gains. Hagendorff et al. (2008) justify their findings also by the fact, that 
bidding banks shareholders must be compensated for the increased risk of minority 
expropriation, which they face in low protection environment.  
 
Although some previous European studies seem to find marginally positive abnormal 
returns for bidding bank shareholders, in general findings in European and U.S. studies 
do not differ drastically. Still, it seems that announcement period abnormal returns to 
bidding bank shareholders are slightly higher in Europe. Interestingly, wealth effects of 
bank M&As have been recently studied on emerging markets as well. Since research 
focus of this thesis is on emerging Russian markets, previous studies on M&A wealth 
effects from emerging markets are important for this thesis. Goddard, Molyneux & 
Zhou (2012) analyze 132 banking M&As in the emerging markets of Asia and Latin 
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America from 1998 to 2009. Study employs well-established event study methodology 
to measure the changes in shareholder wealth following acquisition announcements. 
After the abnormal returns are calculated, authors employ multivariate regression 
models in order to detect the determinants of shareholder value. Goddard et al. (2012) 
focus on both domestic and cross-border acquisition, and measures also the effect of 
government intervention to value creation. Results of the study report modest value 
creation following M&As in emerging markets. More precisely, target bank 
shareholders earn positive abnormal return, while bidding banks shareholders do not 
lose on average. Acquisitions initiated by governments results in higher abnormal 
returns for acquires than privately instigated acquisitions. Considering the deal specific 
characteristic, equity financed deals lead to higher abnormal returns than cash financed 
deals, and more experienced bidders seem to make better acquisitions. Acquiring banks 
shareholders benefit also from the acquisitions of targets that has been performing 
poorly prior the acquisition. Findings on the effect of government intervention to M&A 
returns are interesting for this thesis, since I am also measuring does government 
ownership have an effect on announcement period abnormal returns.  
 
The European financial sector has experienced strong consolidation over the past two 
decades. Following this concentration in banking sector has increased greatly and banks 
have started to look in emerging markets for potential targets. This movement is 
motivated also by the removal of barriers for cross-border acquisitions, which has lead 
to opening of the new markets especially in CEE countries. From 1990 to 2005 M&A 
value in European banking industry was 794 billion USD. Around 4,1% of that was 
related to CEE countries. Cross-border M&A activity in CEE is expected to increase 
even further in the future. This movement has motivated scholars to study wealth effects 
of acquisitions that involve bidding bank from developed markets and target bank from 
emerging markets. (Fritsch, Gleisner & Holzhäuser 2007.) 
 
Fritsch et al. (2007) were among the first to analyze value creation of M&As involving 
bidding bank from Western Europe or U.S. and target bank from CEE.  Using a sample 
of 56 cross-border transactions from 1990 to 2005 scholars analyze abnormal returns 
following acquisition announcements. Findings of the study show that bidding banks do 
not earn abnormal returns following M&A announcements. However, authors find that 
acquiring targets from less developed countries lead to higher value creation. Hence, 
excess returns are mostly explained by country specific macroeconomic factors. 
Authors also find that factors explaining M&A success in developed markets, such as 
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profitability, efficiency or relative size of bidder to target does not explain M&A returns 
in CEE.  
 
Although announcements effects of bank M&As have been widely studied in Western 
Europe and U.S., M&A wealth effects are still relatively under-researched in Eastern 
Europe. Kyriazopoulos (2016) state that, Eastern European banking industry posses 
many distinct features that are not present in Western European banking sector. These 
features include the transition from centrally planned economy to capitalism, the newly 
developed economic systems, the degree of competition for corporate control and 
different legal and institutional frameworks. Kyriazopoulos (2016) argue that, these 
features make Eastern European banking sector ideal place to study market reactions 
following acquisition announcements. Author aims to contribute to the previous 
literature by studying a market that has been recently opened and is still under structural 
changes.  Study focuses explicitly on M&A transactions, where both acquirer and target 
are banks located in Eastern Europe. Final sample of the study consist of 69 M&A 
announcements from 1995 to 2015 and majority of these transactions are domestic. 
Results from the event study show that on average bidding banks do not earn 
statistically significant returns around acquisition dates, while abnormal returns for 
target banks are positive and statistically significant. These findings are on line with the 
previous literature from Western Europe. Kyriazopoulos (2016) also studied does 
method of payment have impact on value creation, and find that cash financed deals 
lead to higher abnormal returns than acquisitions financed with cash and stock. Finally 
similar than in study by Fritsch et al. (2007) standard factors explaining M&A success 
in developed markets has no explanatory power in Eastern Europe.  
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4. THEORY OF MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS AND OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 
 
This chapter introduces relevant theories for this thesis. Although focus of this thesis is 
on short-term market reactions following M&A´s, it is important to understand why do 
mergers tend to come in waves and what are the main reasons to conduct M&A. Since 
this thesis is measuring the effect of ownership structure on post acquisition 
performance, relevant theories concerning ownership structure and firm valuation will 
be covered as well. First I will present the determinants of mergers waves and show 
how the shareholder gains differ during and across merger waves. Second I will go 
through general theories on motives to conduct M&A. Lastly, this chapter describes 
main theories on ownership structure and firm valuation.  
 
 
4.1. Merger waves 
 
It is an established fact that M&A tend to come in waves. Up to now, academic 
literature has identified and examined six takeover waves. Five of these waves occurred 
during the last century. The latest wave started in 2003 and came to an end in mid 2007, 
just before the global financial crisis. M&A waves are defined as periods of unusually 
high transaction value and activity. Clustering of takeover activity is typically high 
during the times of economic recovery and driven by external shocks, such as 
regulatory changes and technological developments. Takeover activity is usually cut 
down by steep decline in stock markets followed by recession. Although M&A waves 
exhibit similar common characteristics, each wave is rather different from previous. 
Previous literature uses different ways when grouping competing merger wave theories. 
I will follow the approach of Martynova & Rennebook (2008) who divide these theories 
into four groups: business environment shocks, corporate governance and agency 
problems, managerial hubris and market timing. 
 
4.1.1. Business environment shocks 
 
First group of merger wave theories believe that takeover clustering is driven by 
different external shocks that motivate companies to restructure their operations to meet 
the changes in business environment. Studies that examine takeover activity in industry 
level have been the most successful in explaining takeover clustering. An example of 
this is the study by Andrade et al. (2001) who provide evidence that during the fourth 
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and the fifth takeover waves merger activity strongly clusters by industry. Researchers 
also find that different shocks such as deregulation, oil price shocks and financial 
innovation explain substantial amount of takeover clustering in the 1980s. Results of 
Andrade & Stafford (2004) further support the theory of industry clustering, as they find 
strong evidence between industry shocks and within-industry takeovers. Furthermore 
Andrede & Stafford (2004) show that forces driving M&A have been different across 
the takeover waves. Industry-wide shocks were the leading drivers of M&A in the 
1970s and 1980s, as they generated excess capacity and forced industries to rearrange 
their assets to respond in new market conditions. In the 1990s takeover activity was 
mostly determined by the factors allowing firms to grow and expand. Andrede & 
Stafford (2004) show that in the 1990s M&A was mostly motivated by industry 
expansion rather than restructuring. Maksimovic & Phillips (2001) study the intra-
industry firm-level determinants of takeovers and find that during industry expansion 
less efficient targets are more likely to sell their assets to more efficient acquirers. This 
redistribution of assets is likely in industries that experience a surge in demand. These 
findings suggest that industry-wide shocks can explain large proposition of takeover 
clustering.  
 
Technological development is another factor explaining takeover clustering. Jovanovic 
& Rousseau (2002) argue that technological change increases the gap in companies 
growth prospects measured by Tobin’s Q. This dispersion in growth prospects leads to 
situation where high-Q firms are taking over low-Q firms in a wave like patterns. This 
finding is supported by the findings of Andrade et al. (2001) who report that in more 
than two-thirds of all mergers since 1973, acquirers Q was higher than targets Q. On the 
contrary, Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson (2008) finds that high-Q bidders do not usually 
acquire low-Q targets. Authors argue that in most acquisitions target and bidder have 
similar growth prospects. This finding is line with the synergy theory of mergers, 
indicating that M&A is done in order to improve efficiency and to eliminate 
overlapping operations.  
 
4.1.2. Agency problems and corporate governance 
 
Previous literature concludes that large proportion of M&A leads to value destruction 
instead of value creation. In light of this finding scholars have started to wonder 
whether managerial self-dealing has an effect to M&A decisions. Schleifer & Vishny 
(1991) studied the determinants of M&A in the ‘60s and the 80’s and suggest that 
personal objectives of corporate managers played crucial role in formation of the third 
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merger wave. Majority of the takeover transactions in 1960s were diversifying rather 
than focusing. Schleifer & Vishny (1991) argue that diversifying takeovers in the 1960s 
increased the agency problems between managers and shareholders, as managers used 
acquisitions to protect their own position. Similarly, Amihud & Lev (1981) argue that 
risk-averse managers use diversifying acquisitions to smooth the earnings volatility. 
This activity can protect managers’ own position, but it can be in conflict with the 
shareholders interest and create an agency cost problem.  
 
Jensen (1986) study the agency cost of free cash flow in the context of takeovers. He 
finds that agency problems are likely to spawn a takeover wave when favorable market 
conditions results in excess cash flows in the hands of managers. Instead of distributing 
these excess funds for the shareholders, self-interest managers may go for “empire 
building”, which refers to attempts to increase scope and size of managers 
organizational power and influence. Jensen (1986) also argues that managers tend to 
make bad acquisitions when they have excess cash and don’t know how to spend it. 
This hypothesis is supported by empirical literature, which finds that firms with excess 
cash flows make value-decreasing acquisitions. For example Hartford (1999) show that 
cash-rich bidders make acquisitions that destroys value and that negative abnormal 
return decreases in the amount of free cash flow held by bidder. Hartford (1999) also 
investigated the characteristics of cash-rich bidders and find that they are more likely to 
conduct diversifying acquisitions than cash-poor bidders, and that cash-rich bidders tend 
to acquire targets of the interest of other bidders.  
 
4.1.3. Managerial hubris and herding 
 
Among with the business environmental shocks and agency problems, managerial 
hubris and herding behavior has been linked to takeover clustering. When bidding 
firms’ management is affected by hubris they are suffering from bounded rationality 
and end up paying too much for the targets. Roll (1986) suggest that managerial hubris 
is the main reason behind value destructing acquisitions, as overconfident managers 
overestimate the potential synergy gains from mergers and end up paying too much for 
the targets. According to Roll’s (1986) hubris theory, if markets are efficient there are 
no gains from acquisitions, and takeovers occur simply because acquiring firm’s 
managers are affected by hubris and make incorrect valuations. Research by Georgen & 
Renneboog (2004) further support Roll’s (1986) hubris theory as they find that one third 
of large European takeover bids in the 1990s were affected by managerial hubris.  
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Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis combined with herding behavior can partially explain 
takeover clustering. Herding behavior refers to situation where individuals mimic the 
actions of larger groups. Herding behavior can lead to merger waves, as the first 
successful transactions motivate other companies to carry out similar transactions. 
Herding usually leads to situation where acquisitions are mostly motivated by the 
actions of other companies rather than economic reasoning. Takeovers affected by 
herding suffer from managerial hubris, as managers overestimate the synergistic 
benefits and end up overpaying for targets. Therefore, combination of herding & hubris 
leads to situation where rational acquisitions are followed by irrational acquisitions 
(Martynova & Rennebook 2008). This assumption of hubris and herding is supported by 
the study of Hartford (2005) who find that takeovers occurring in the later stage of the 
takeover wave lead to lower abnormal returns than those at the beginning of the wave.  
 
4.1.4. Market timing  
 
Market timing theories of merger waves build upon the assumption that merger waves 
are caused by market timing attempts by corporate managers. During the times of 
financial market boom, corporate managers may try to take advantage of temporally 
overvalued equity and used it to purchase less overvalued targets (Myers & Majluf 
1984). Based upon this assumption Shleifer & Vishny (2003) propose a theory where 
acquisitions are driven by stock market valuation of merging firms. Opposite to Roll’s 
(1986) hubris theory researchers assume that corporate managers are rational and 
financial markets are inefficient. Rational managers understand market inefficiencies, 
and take advantage of them by acquiring undervalued assets. According to Shleifer & 
Vishny (2003) merger waves occur because of temporary market inefficiencies. 
Booming stock markets tend to temporally overvalue equity, and the level of 
overvaluation varies greatly across companies. Rational managers of acquiring firms 
take advantage of this temporal dispersion and purchase less overvalued targets using 
their own overvalued equity.   
 
The relationship between market valuation and mergers waves is investigated also in the 
study by Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan (2004). Authors argue that theory of overvalued 
bidders taking over less overvalued targets is incomplete, because targets should not 
accept overvalued equity. In spite of this expectation, authors show that when the 
markets are booming target firm managers accept overvalued bids, mainly because they 
overestimate the possible synergies from these transactions. This is explained by the 
fact that even rational managers make mistakes in extreme market conditions. Findings 
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of Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan (2004) suggest that misvaluation has a substantial 
impact of all mergers, and that period of stock market undervaluation and overvaluation 
drive merger waves. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson & Teoh (2006) complement these 
findings by providing additional evidence on misvaluation theories of takeovers. Using 
the residual-income-to market ratio authors find that bidders are on average more 
overvalued than targets, and that increase in bidder overvaluation increases the 
probability of takeover. These finding support the hypothesis suggesting that 
acquisitions are driven by stock markets. Dong et al. (2006) also show that Q-theory 
described in the business environment shocks chapter explains takeover clustering prior 
the 1990s, while evidence for overvaluation hypothesis is stronger in the 1990-2000 
period. 
 
 
4.2. M&A motives 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce different theories explaining the motives 
behind takeover decisions. First I will introduce general motives for M&A decisions. 
Following that the motives and characteristics of banking M&A will be presented in a 
separate section. Of course every M&A transaction is unique and motivated by different 
reason. However, in general acquirer motives can be classified either as value-
increasing or value-decreasing. Value-increasing motives for M&A include different 
synergistic theories, whereas typical value-decreasing motives for M&A are related to 
managerial hubris, agency conflicts and market timing Nguyen, Yung & Sun (2012) 
studied the motives behind 3520 U.S. domestic M&As between the years 1984 and 
2004 and find that over 78% of these transactions are related to at least two different 
motives. Researchers argue that it is hard to establish a clear picture on M&A motives, 
as value-increasing and value-decreasing motives typically co-exist. However, authors 
find evidence that merger motivation include market timing, synergies, managerial 
hubris and responses to industry shocks. 
 
4.2.1. Value-increasing theories 
 
Synergies are probably the most quoted reason for M&As. The idea behind synergies is 
that two firms combined are more valuable than two separate entities.  Synergies should 
create value for the shareholders of both the acquiring firm and the target. When the 
merging firms are combined, cost savings can be achieved by cutting overlapping 
operations and by creating the economies of scale (Weitzel 2011). Nguyen et al. (2012) 
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argue that synergistic acquisitions are driven by several different motives. These 
motives include increase in market power, responses to industry shocks, operational 
synergies, financial synergies and economies of scale. Previous literature on the 
synergistic acquisitions finds some proof for these motives. Helay, Palupu & Ruback 
(1992) study whether corporate performance improves after acquisitions and find 
evidence for operational synergy hypothesis. In particular researchers find that, merged 
firms have compelling improvements on their operational cash flows compared to their 
non-merging peers. These improvements are mostly driven by improvements in asset 
productivity and are stronger for firms with overlapping business. Findings of Helay et 
al. (1992) support the hypothesis that M&A can indeed lead to efficiency improvements 
through operational synergies. 
 
Considering the financial synergies motive Ghos & Jain (2000) find that financial 
leverage measured by the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of assets 
increases significantly following mergers. This increase in financial leverage is mostly 
driven by the increase in debt capacity, that merging firms can achieve by combining 
together. Researchers also show that increase in financial leverage around mergers is 
positively correlated with announcement period market-adjusted returns. Ghos & Jain 
(2000) argue that an increase in financial leverage can benefit shareholders of the 
merging firm in two ways. First benefit arises from the tax deducibility of interest 
payments. Because interest payments of corporate debt are tax deductible, shareholders 
can benefit from the increase in financial leverage. Shareholders of merging firm can 
also increase their wealth thought the expropriation of wealth from bondholders by 
financing merger with debt. Previous literature from the tax-associated motivation for 
mergers is somewhat mixed as Hayn (1989) show that tax considerations motivate firms 
to acquire, but Auerbach & Reishus (1988) argue that even thought firms can achieve 
tax benefits from acquisitions, these benefits are not driving factors for takeover 
decisions. 
 
Market power theory offers alternative motive for wealth increasing M&A. According 
to market power theory, firms can benefit from increased market power by charging 
higher prices from customers and earn greater margins (Weitzel 2011). Kim & Singal 
(1993) study the effects of mergers in airline industry between the years 1985 and 1988 
and find support for market power theory. Researchers show that merging firms were 
able to charge higher prices from their customers relative to their non-merging 
competitors. Increased prices led to higher profitability and had positive impact on 
shareholder wealth. These findings are strictly in line with market power theory, 
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suggesting that acquiring market power leads to higher profitability.  On the other hand 
studies by Mueller (1985) and Eckbo (1992) show that attempts to increase market 
power through M&A does not pay. Yet again the evidence on the profitability of market 
position increasing M&A is mixed. While some studies find it to be profitable, other 
find that it may be even harmful. Despite the contradictory evidence on the profitability 
of market power increasing M&A, it still is one most popular motive for M&A.  
 
Another motive for value-increasing M&A arises from the theory of corporate control. 
One of principals of management is that managers should run the company in a way that 
maximizes shareholder wealth. According to the theory of corporate control, if a firm is 
managed poorly and is underperforming relative to it’s peers there is always another 
firm that is willing to takeover poorly performing firm and replace its underperforming 
management. Replacement of an underperforming management should increase the 
performance of acquired firm and maximize shareholder wealth. According to corporate 
control theory hostile takeover are likely to happen in a poorly managed firms, as 
incumbent managers are likely to resist takeover attempts. Research by Jensen & 
Ruback (1983) finds some support for corporate control theory. Scholars argue that 
mergers do increase shareholder value and that this increase does not come from the 
creation of the market power. They also argue that increase in shareholder wealth is 
partly attributable for the new managers, which allow the firm to be more efficient and 
profitable in the future. (Weitzel 2011.)  
 
4.2.2. Value-decreasing theories 
 
As described in the literature review majority of M&A transactions fails to create value 
for the acquiring firm. Even thought M&A is a popular restructuring tool and usually 
done in order to increase operational efficiency and profitability, it is an established fact 
that majority of M&As fail. Failure rate of M&A has motivated scholars to put on 
value-decreasing theories, to better understand what drives takeover decisions. 
According to Weitzel (2011) value-decreasing theories can be split into two groups: The 
first group assumes that bidding firm management is suffering from bounded 
rationality, and thus makes mistakes that lead to losses as a result of informational 
constraints, despite having value-increasing intentions. The second group of theories 
assumes that managers are rational, but instead of maximizing the firm value they aim 
to maximize their own utility at the expense of shareholders. First group of theories 
include Roll´s (1986) theory of managerial hubris and Jensen´s (1986) theory of 
managerial discretion. The second group includes theory of managerial entrenchment by 
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Sceifler and Vishny (1986) and theory of empire building by Marris (1963). All of these 
theories are already introduced on the chapter 4.1 as driving forces for mergers waves, 
thus I will not present them again in this section. 
 
 
4.3. Determinants of M&A in banking 
 
In this chapter I will cover the literature on the determinants and characteristics of 
banking M&A. As mentioned before consolidation in financial industry has been 
intense during the past few decades. Due to the consolidation number of operating 
banks has declined significantly. The number of credit institutions in EU-15 dropped 
from 12,000 at the end of year 1990 to only a bit over 7000 in 2004, with domestic 
M&A being the driving force for this decline (Asimakopoulus & Athanasoglou 2013). 
As a result of this consolidation typical financial service firm is now larger, more 
diversified and operates in more markets than ever before. Financial and technological 
innovations combined with the deregulation of financial markets have been the broad 
forces behind this movement.  Consolidation of global financial service firms is 
expected to continue even further, as banks are re-structuring to respond in changing 
regulation, technological innovations and crisis that shake up our financial system. 
(DeYoung et al. 2009.) 
 
Technological progress have had huge role in banking industry consolidation. Banks are 
major users of financial and informational technology and developments in these fields 
have altered banks production functions leading to changes in how banks operate. 
Berger (2003) investigates the effects of technological progress in banking industry and 
finds that improvements in “back-office” technologies and “front-office” processing 
have cut costs for the banks and enabled them to increase their lending capacity. Berger 
(2003) suggests that progress in technology facilitates consolidation in several ways. 
First new banking products created by technology development generate opportunities 
for efficiency improvements through the fast spread of these products by M&A. Second 
technology improvements help banks to identify potential targets where they can 
improve efficiency by implementing these new technologies. Third technological 
progress reduces risks and transaction cost associated with M&A. All in all, Berger 
(2003) finds that progress in technology facilitates consolidation by making it more 
efficient for banks to be larger, more geographically dispersed and to engage in M&A 
activity.  
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In addition to progress in technology, deregulation of financial markets have had huge 
impact on consolidation in banking industry. Deregulation of financial markets allowed 
banks to expand their operations into geographical areas and product markets, which 
were previously off-limits. This expansion was done mainly via M&A. The number of 
bank M&A started to slowly increase in the U.S. in early 1980s, and really took of in 
early 1990s. Deal volumes in European banking sector started to increase in the end 
1990s, as the EU’s directive of financial market integration was approved. (DeYoung et 
al. 2009.) 
 
As described above deregulation and technological innovation have been the broad 
forces driving consolidation in the banking sector. These factors have enabled rapid 
expansion of the banking sector, and the main motive behind this expansion is the desire 
to sell more services. In addition to broad forces that drive consolidation in financial 
industry, determinants that increase the likelihood of being either a target or an acquirer 
have been studied as well.  Several studies examine the profitability of banking M&A 
by focusing on the abnormal returns around the acquisition date. In addition to the 
abnormal returns of M&A transactions, it is important to understand the determinants 
underlying these transitions, as these factors may affect to M&A profitability.  Previous 
research on M&A determinants mostly focuses on bank–specific variables such as size, 
leverage, liquidity, profitably and growth. (Beccali & Frantz 2013.) 
 
Size of a target or acquirer may affect M&A in numerous ways. It is obvious that larger 
banks are more expensive to acquire than smaller banks. Larger banks have also more 
resources, and these banks can use these resources to acquire smaller banks or to fight 
against hostile acquisitions. Previous findings of the association between bank size and 
probability of being acquired are a bit mixed. Moore (1997) finds that banks market 
share, capital asset ratios and profitability are negatively related to likelihood of being 
acquired. On the other hand Akhigbe, Madura & Whyte (2004) study a sample of 254 
U.S. banking acquisitions from 1987 to 2001 and find that probability of being acquired 
is higher for large banks, banks that have lower return on assets and higher levels of 
capital.  
 
Growth is another factor that may increase banks attractiveness as a target. Banks with 
high historical growth rates may appear as potential targets. On the other hand acquires 
may seek targets with a low historical growth rates, as they think that they could 
accelerate targets growth and hence increase its market value. Pasiouras, Tanna & 
Gaganis (2011) study the determinants of commercial bank acquisitions in European 
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Union single market from 1997 to 2002 focusing on bank and market specific factors. 
Their findings indicate that banks with slow growth rates may end up acquired, as 
targets are found to be less profitable with lower growth prospects and acquires are 
found to be more profitable with higher growth prospects. Findings of Beccanelli et al. 
(2013) also show that historical growth is associated with likelihood of being acquired, 
as they find that banks with history of high growth are more likely to become acquired 
than banks with lower historical growth rates.  
 
Liquidity is another important variable that may influence banks attractiveness as a 
target. The effect on liquidity can be either negative or positive depending on the 
acquiring bank motives. If a bank is failing to meet the liquidity obligations it may end 
up as a target, signaling that low liquidity increases the acquisition likelihood. On the 
contrary excess liquidity may indicate the lack of investment opportunities or poor 
allocation of assets, making these banks as an attractive targets for acquirers with 
liquidity constraints. Findings of Pasiouras et al. (2011) indicate inverse relationship 
between liquidity and likelihood of being target, as target banks are less profitable with 
lower liquidity and lower growth in total assets, while acquires are more profitable 
banks with higher growth prospects. Results of Beccanelli et al. (2013) further support 
the theory that low liquidity increases the likelihood of acquisition, as they find that 
acquires had lower capital strength and higher liquidity on year prior the M&A.   
 
In addition to liquidity capital strength can also influence banks M&A decisions. 
Beccanelli et al. (2013) argue that capital strength measured as equity over total assets 
can be either positively or negatively related to banks attractiveness as a target. Most of 
the previous banking studies find negative relation between capital strength and 
probability of being target (Hannan & Pilloff 2009; Pasiouris et al. 2011). Beccanelli et 
al. (2013) provide arguments to support both the negative and positive relation between 
capital strength and probability of being acquired. First argument to support negative 
relation is that if capitalization is a proxy of managerial efficiency, acquirers are likely 
to takeover less capitalized banks as they provide greater turnaround potential. The 
second argument to support negative relation is that lower capitalized banks are cheaper 
to takeover and therefore more attractive targets. In contract, argument to support 
positive relation is that acquirers prefers highly capitalized banks if they face regulatory 
pressure to increase capitalization. By taking over highly capitalized banks acquires can 
meet up the regulatory obligations. The second argument supporting positive relation is 
that if highly capitalized banks are unable to diversify their assets these banks are more 
 
 
  
 
38 
worth to acquirers who can diversify their asset better, thus being highly capitalized can 
increase the likelihood of being acquired. 
 
Loan activity is another bank-specific variable to consider when evaluating potential 
targets. Hannan & Rhoades (1987) note that banks with large loan portfolios are likely 
to have aggressive lending behavior and strong market penetration, thus they may seem 
like an attractive targets. On the contrary banks with relatively small loan portfolios 
may lack lending opportunities or suffer from conservative management. Larger more 
aggressive bank may therefore take them over and increase lending to increase returns. 
Loan activity is usually measured as loan-to-asset ratio. Previous studies find negative 
relation between loan activity and acquisition likelihood (Hannan & Rhoades (1987; 
Pasiouris et al. 2011). 
 
Altogether, bank specific variables should be considered when evaluating determinants 
of M&A and the profitability banking M&A. I will also include bank specific variables 
in my regression analysis, in order to find the factors explaining M&A success in Russia 
 
 
4.4. Ownership structure and firm value 
 
Since this thesis is measuring the effect of ownership structure on post acquisition 
performance, it is useful to understand how does ownership structure affect firm value.  
Ownership structures and economic landscape varies a lot around the globe, and the 
dispersedly held corporations typically seen in UK and US are rather rare in Russia. On 
the contrary ownership concentration and state participation in financial markets are 
very common in Russia, especially in the banking sector. Previous studies on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm value show that firm value may 
differ due to different ownership structures. In this chapter, I will present some previous 
studies on the issue.  
 
The relation between ownership structure and performance has been a topic of debate 
since the seminal work by Berle & Means (1932). Scholars argue that dispersed 
ownership reduces the shareholders ability to monitor and control the management of 
the firm, highlighting the principal-agent problem. Similarly Shleifer & Vishny (1986) 
argue that ownership concentration improve corporate control by improving the 
shareholders’ ability to monitor the management. Ownership concentration may thus 
reduce the agency problem between shareholders and the management. On the other 
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hand, large shareholders may have interests that are different from the interest of 
minority shareholders. Thus, they may end up exploiting minority shareholders to serve 
their own interest. In line with these finding, previous research has identified two well-
defined agency problems that should be taken into account when analyzing the 
corporate control structures. These agency problems are defined as principal-agent 
problem and minority expropriation problem. 
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) were among the first to present the idea of minority 
expropriation and the classical principal agent problem. Minority expropriation problem 
occurs when controlling shareholder engages into non-wealth maximizing activity in 
order to receive personal benefits from the control of the corporation. Minority 
expropriation can be further intensified by the use different corporate control methods, 
such as stock pyramids, cross-shareholdings, and dual class shares (La Porta et al. 
1999).  By the use of control methods, controlling shareholder may hold majority of the 
voting rights, while at the same time they are holding only fraction of the cash flow 
rights. The separation of ownership from control can thus increase the possibility of 
minority expropriation and increase agency costs (Ben-Amar & André 2006).  
 
Thomsen & Pedersen (2000) investigate the relation between ownership structure and 
firm performance using data on 435 largest European companies between the years 
1990–1995. Ownership structures are classified based on the largest shareholder of the 
company. Scholars argue that the share and the identity of the largest shareholder is a 
fairly good measure of ownership structure for the European companies, since 
ownership concentration is rather common in Europe. Sample is further divided into 
five different ownership categories: institutional investor, bank, non-financial company, 
family/person and government. Scholars measure economic performance by asset 
returns and market-to-book ratios. Industry, capital structure and national effects are 
controlled by the use of dummy variables.  
 
The main finding of the study by Thomsen & Pedersen (2000) is that ownership 
concentration has a positive effect on shareholder value. However, the effect levels of 
for the high ownership shares, since the ownership share has a positive and significant 
effect on market-to-book ratios, and the square of ownership share has a negative and 
significant effect. So the effect of ownership concentration is bell-shaped rather than 
linear. The effect of ownership concentration on company performance depends on 
ownership identity, as results are different for different types of ownership.  Findings of 
Thomsen & Pedersen (2000) support also the hypothesis that the identity of a large 
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owner has significant implications for the company strategy and performance. 
Companies owned by financial institutions have higher market-to-book ratios than 
companies owned by government. In general the main goal of the financial institutions 
and institutional investor are to maximize the profits, whereas companies owned by 
governments and families may consider other aspects as well. 
 
Bennett (2010) examine the effect of ownership structure on the market assessment of 
asset sales. The goal of the paper is to find out whether ownership structure affects firm 
performance. Bennett (2010) classifies his sample firms into three categories based on 
ownership structure: large inside shareholders, large outside shareholders and widely 
held firms. Performance is measured by markets reaction to asset sales announcements 
using well-established event study methodology. Furthermore, the cumulative abnormal 
returns are compared between these three ownership groups, and tested using dummy 
variable regressions.  
 
The empirical results of Bennett’s (2010) study indicate that ownership structure does 
have an effect on markets assessment on asset sales. Abnormal returns are significantly 
greater for firms with large outside shareholder when compared to widely held firms 
and firms with large inside shareholders for both buying and selling samples. The 
results of the Bennett´s (2010) study show that agency problem found in previous 
literature is not only present in widely held firms, but also in firms with large inside 
ownership. Altogether findings of the study are in line with the previous studies on the 
relation between ownership structure and firm performance, indicating that large outside 
shareholder may have positive effect on firm performance.  
 
Iannotta, Nocera & Sironi (2007) evaluate the impact of different ownership structures 
on bank performance and risk in the European banking industry. Sample of the study 
consist of 181 large banks from 15 European countries between the years 1999 and 
2004. Iannotta et al. (2007) argue that a firm’s ownership structure is defined along two 
main dimensions, ownership concentration and the nature of ownership. At first firms 
may differ, as their ownership structure is more or less concentrated. At second two 
firms may have the same degree of ownership concentration, but one is publicly owned 
and the other privately held. Scholars present three types of ownership structures that 
coexist within European banking industry: privately owned stock banks, mutual banks, 
and government-owned banks. Despite the ownership structure differs between these 
three groups, they are competing at the same market within same regulatory framework 
and institutional settings. Iannotta et al. (2007) argue that since these banks are 
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competing in same markets under same rules any structural differences in their 
performance may be regard as inefficiency.  
 
The results of Ianotta et al. (2007) show that bank risk and performance differ between 
different ownership structures. Authors find significant differences in risk and 
performance, after controlling for bank characteristics country and time effects. 
Summing up the results show that government-owned banks are less profitable and 
more risky than privately owned banks, although they are having lower costs. 
Profitability is highest among privately owned banks and this profitability comes from 
higher net returns on earning assets instead of better cost efficiency. Concerning the 
risks, public sector banks are having poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than 
privately owned banks and mutual banks. Findings on the effect of ownership 
concentration are a bit inconsistent. Ianotta et al. (2007) find that profitability is not 
significantly different between banks with concentrated ownership structure and banks 
with more dispersed ownership structure. However, higher ownership concentration is 
associated with better loan quality, lower insolvency risks and lower asset risk.  
 
Most of the studies addressing the issue between ownership structure and performance 
focus on developed markets and non-financial firms. Ownership structures and 
institutional settings are vastly different in emerging markets, when compared to 
developed markets. Therefore, the results from studies on developed countries may not 
be generalized or applicable in emerging markets. Studies on ownership structures and 
bank performance from emerging markets are more relevant for this study also, since I 
am focusing on emerging Russian markets. Rahman & Reja (2015) study the impact of 
different ownership structures on bank performance in developing Malaysian markets 
during 2000 – 2011. Rahman & Reja (2015) test five categories of ownership including: 
insider, family, government, institutional and foreign ownership. Bank performance is 
measured by return on equity and return on assets. The impact of ownership structure on 
bank performance is further tested with multiple regressions with fixed effects.  
 
The results of Rahman & Reja (2015) suggest that different types of bank ownership 
have an impact on bank performance. Findings of the government ownership on bank 
performance are in line with the results of Iannotta et al. (2007) as high level of 
government ownership decreases bank performance. Insider ownership is also 
significantly decreasing bank performance. This result is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that insider ownership increases bank performance. However, Rahman & 
Reja (2015) argue that possibly existing shares held by the insiders are not sufficient 
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enough to align insider’s motives with managers and shareholders, and to motivate them 
to work towards maximizing shareholder value. Rahman & Reja (2015) results for other 
ownership categories in the study are insignificant.  
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the research hypotheses, data and methodology used in this study.  
First subsection presents research hypotheses. Following that data used in this study is 
defined and described. Lastly, applied research methodologies are presented. 
 
 
5.1. Research hypotheses   
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate short-term profitability of the Russian 
banking M&A and the relationship between ownership structure and post acquisition 
performance. More precisely, this thesis investigates whether concentrated ownership 
lead to better post acquisition performance, does owning a minority stake of the target 
prior the acquisition increase post acquisition performance and what is the impact of 
state ownership on post acquisition performance. In order to answer to the research 
questions six hypotheses are formed.  
 
Most of the previous research studying short-term profitability of M&A find that 
abnormal returns around announcement date are either zero or negative for acquiring 
firms (Campa & Hernando 2006; Beltratti & Paladino 2013). In light of these findings 
the first hypothesis is formed as follows: 
 
H1: Mergers and acquisitions cause negative abnormal returns for acquiring firm 
shareholders 
 
The second hypothesis is related on the impact of geographical scope of the transaction. 
Campa & Hernando (2006) study a European sample of 244 M&As from financial 
industry from 1998 to 2002 and find that domestic transactions yields relatively better 
returns for acquirers than cross-border transactions. The second hypothesis is motivated 
by these findings and is constructed as follows: 
 
H2: Domestic M&A transactions lead to better post acquisition performance than 
cross-border M&A transactions 
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The third hypothesis answers to the question whether state ownership has a positive 
impact on post acquisition performance.  Previous research by Du & Boateng (2014) 
finds that state ownership has a positive and significant impact on announcement period 
abnormal returns in China. Authors argue that Chinese firms with state ownership 
benefit from political ties with government and preferential access to resources.  In light 
of these findings the third hypothesis is constructed as follows: 
 
H3: State ownership has a positive impact on post acquisition performance 
 
The fourth hypothesis is motivated by the findings of Yen & André (2007) and by the 
assumption that ownership concentration lead to decreasing agency costs and therefore 
better post acquisition performance. The fourth hypothesis is constructed as follows: 
 
H4: Ownership concentration leads to better post acquisition performance 
 
The fifth hypothesis builds upon the assumption that owning stake of the target prior the 
acquisition leads to inside information on target’s business and future prospects. Thus, it 
will lead to better post acquisition performance. This hypothesis is also motivated by 
the previous findings on the positive relation between experience of the bidder and post 
acquisition performance (Goddard et al. 2012). The fifth is constructed as follows: 
 
H5: Owning a stake of the target prior acquisition increase post acquisition 
performance 
 
Lastly, the sixth hypothesis investigates whether abnormal returns are different during 
the financial crisis. Beltratti & Paladino (2013) find that during financial crisis investors 
assign much more uncertainty for the completion of M&A transactions, and reward 
successful deals with delayed abnormal returns. In light of these findings sixth 
hypothesis is constructed as follows:  
 
H6: Abnormal returns following acquisition announcements are lower during financial 
crisis 
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5.2. Data 
 
The first set of data used in this study consists of acquisition announcements of publicly 
traded Russian banks. This data is collected from the databases of the University of 
Vaasa, where the original data source is Thomson Reuters. This study focuses on M&A 
deals that occurred between the years 2005 and 2016. Few of the previous studies find 
that post acquisition performance may be different during financial crisis and market 
turmoil. During the sample period, there were two major crises in the Russian markets 
that might have affected stock returns of the sample firms. First of these events was the 
global financial crisis of 2008. The second of these events is the recent financial crisis 
in Russia that started with the collapse of Ruble in the second half of 2014. In order to 
see whether the abnormal returns have been different during crisis, the effect of 
financial crisis on abnormal returns following acquisition announcements is analyzed. 
My original idea was to analyze the effects of the recent financial crisis in Russia, 
which started in 2014, but after matching the data with sample criteria below, there were 
no single event left to analyze between the years 2014 and 2016. In the end the final 
sample period is 2005 – 2013, and the financial crisis period is defined as 2008 – 2010. 
Final sample is set to match the following criteria: 
 
(i) The announcement date of the deals is between 01.01.2005 and 31.12.2016 
(ii) Both the acquirer and the target are banks or credit institutions having the 
SIC code of 6000 
(iii) M&A deals have been completed and not pending or withdraw 
(iv) The acquiring bank is Russian and publicly traded 
(v) Bidding bank acquired at least 10% of target banks equity  
(vi) Multiple transactions by the same bidder within 30-day rolling window are 
excluded. This is done in order to avoid possible bias that overlapping events 
could cause. 
 
Matching the data with sample criteria lead to final sample of 20 M&A transactions. 11 
of these transactions were domestic and 9 cross-border. As mentioned before, there was 
no single M&A deal within the Russian banking sector that matched the sample criteria 
between the years 2014 and 2016. So, eventually this thesis focuses on M&A deals in 
Russian banking sector between the years 2005 and 2013. Because of the lack of data, 
the original idea of analyzing subsample for recent Russian financial crisis is abandon.  
Since there were no single M&A transaction matching the sample criteria, it is clear that 
the recent financial crisis in Russia and the recent actions of CBR has reduced takeover 
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activity in the Russian banking sector. Table 2 presents the distribution of deals by year. 
As it can be seen from the table the sample is scattered quite evenly across the years. 
However, following the financial crisis of 2008 – 2010 there were modest increase in 
takeover activity. This indicates that the takeover activity increased after the financial 
crisis. 
 
 
Table 2. Distributions of M&A deals by year. 
 
 
   After the announcement dates of M&As is identified next step is to obtain share prices 
of bidding banks surrounding the acquisition announcements. In addition, returns of the 
benchmark index are needed for the calculation of abnormal returns. There are two 
major indexes in Russian stock markets, namely MICEX Index and RTS Index. Both of 
these indexes are capitalization-weighted composite indices, based on the prices of most 
liquid Russian stocks. MICEX Index is denominated in rubbles and RTS Index is 
denominated in dollars. MICEX Index is chosen as a proxy for market returns. 
Historical prices for acquiring banks and for benchmark index are collected through 
Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
 
In order to measure the impact of ownership structures on post acquisition performance, 
Information on shareholders of bidding banks is needed. This information is hand-
Year M&As %
2005 1 5%
2006 2 10%
2007 0 0%
2008 1 5%
2009 2 10%
2010 3 15%
2011 4 20%
2012 4 20%
2013 3 15%
2014 0 0%
2015 0 0%
2016 0 0%
Total 20 100%
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collected mainly from annual reports of bidding banks and from banks web pages. Key 
financials of bidding banks are retrieved from Bureau van Dijk's Orbis database.  
 
 
5.3. Event study methodology 
 
Most of the previous studies measuring shareholder wealth effects following M&A 
announcements use event study methodology. This approach is usually two-staged, first 
the abnormal returns following acquisition announcements are calculated and then these 
returns are regressed to a set of control variables. According to Andrade et al. (2001) 
and as mentioned before, the most statistically reliable evidence on M&A value creation 
comes from the short-window event studies. This study will follow the approach of 
previous studies and use well-established event study methodology to measure the 
shareholder wealth effects following M&A announcements.  
 
Event studies are used to capture some specific events impact on company´s market 
value. This event can be a macroeconomic event or a company specific news 
announcement, such as earnings announcement, dividend announcement or like in this 
thesis acquisition announcement. Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969) were among the 
first to present event study methodology when they studied the impact of stock splits on 
stock prices. After that event studies have become widely used methodology in the field 
of economics, accounting and finance. According to MacKinlay (1997) event study is a 
powerful way to measure certain event’s impact on company’s value and returns. The 
usefulness of these studies relies on the efficient market hypothesis, assuming that the 
impact of some specific event will be reflected on the security prices immediately.  
 
First step in event study analysis is to calculate the realized returns for acquiring banks 
and for the market index. Realized returns are needed to calculate abnormal returns. 
Realized returns can be calculated using absolute values or by using logarithmic values. 
Majority of the previous studies use logarithmic values for return calculations. 
Vaihekoski (2016) also suggest using the logarithmic returns, so logarithmic values are 
used in this thesis as well. Realized returns can be calculated using following formula: 
 
(1)  𝑅!" = 𝑙𝑛 !!"!!,!!! ,  
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Where, R it is the realized return for stock i in time t, Pit is the price of the stock i in time 
t, and Pi, t-1 is the price for stock i at time t – 1. 
 
After the realized returns have been calculated next step is to obtain expected returns 
within event window. Setting up event window is a crucial part in event study, and it 
should be set in a way that it immediately captures the information content of the 
announcement. Along with the event window, estimation window is set to estimate the 
parameters α and β for statistical analysis of abnormal returns. Normal length of the 
estimation window is 250 trading days (MacKinlay 1997). Following previous research 
estimation window is set to 250 trading days also for this study. Estimation window and 
event window cannot overlap, so the estimation period is set to end one-day prior event 
window. For this study event window is set as 21 days surrounding the acquisition 
announcement. This is done in order to investigate potential information leakages prior 
the acquisition announcement and to capture potential sluggish market reaction. 
(MacKinlay 1997).  
 
Brown & Warner (1980) were among the first to present the idea of using market model 
in event studies when they studied the information content of earnings announcements. 
Market model has afterwards established as the most used and most reliable tool in 
event study analysis. Market model allows one to study return of any given asset 
compared to market portfolio. The model contains econometric parameters α and β. 
These parameters are derived from historical prices of market portfolio and stock i. 
With the ordinary least square estimators α and β expected return for stock i is a linear 
function, where β measures the sensitivity of stock i compared to market portfolios 
return. Market model is used also in this study in order to analyze investor’s reaction to 
acquisition announcements of Russian banks. The equation for market model is 
following:   
 
(2)   𝐸(𝑅!") = 𝛼!  +  𝛽!  𝑅!" +  𝜀!" 
 
Where 𝐸(𝑅!") is the expected return for stock i at time t, 𝑅!" is the return of the 
benchmark market portfolio at time t, 𝜀!" is the error term for security i at time t and 𝛼!  and 𝛽!  are stock specific parameters that are estimated using ordinary least squares. 
These parameters are estimated from the historical prices starting 260 prior acquisitions 
and ending 10 days before the acquisition announcement. Timeline for event study is 
shown in figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2. Event study timeline. 
 
 
After the expected returns are calculated, next step is to calculate the abnormal returns. 
The basic idea behind event studies is to investigate whether some event, which in this 
study is M&A, has impact on a company’s market value. Abnormal return is the 
difference between actual return and expected return. Abnormal returns are calculated 
using following formula: 
 
(3)  𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑅!" − 𝐸 (𝑅!") 
 
Where 𝐴𝑅!" is the abnormal returns for the stock i at time t, 𝑅!" is the realized return for 
stock i at time t and 𝐸 (𝑅!") is the expected normal return calculated with equation (2). 
 
As mentioned above the event window T is 21 days: T= [-10; +10] days, where t=0 
denotes the announcement day. Inside this event window several different periods such 
as (-1; +1), (-3; +3), and (+1; +5) are studied as well. After the abnormal returns are 
calculated they are averaged using the following formula. 
 
(4)  𝐴𝑅! = !!  
i=1
n
∑ ∙ 𝐴𝑅!"  
Where N is the number of stocks analyzed and t is the point of time to analyze. (Beitel 
et al. 2004) 
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Next the abnormal returns are aggregated over the event window. Following Beitel et al. 
(2004) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for interval (𝑡!, 𝑡!) are calculated using 
following formula: 
 
(5)   𝐶𝐴𝑅(!!,!!) =
(t1,t2 )
∑ 𝐴𝑅! =
(t1,t2 )
∑ !!  ∙
i=1
n
∑ 𝐴𝑅!"   
  
Where CARt1, t2 is the cumulative average abnormal return for the period t1 – t2. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns show the total impact of M&A announcements on 
shareholders wealth.  
 
Last step in event study analysis is to test, whether abnormal returns are statistically 
significant. Statistical significance of average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAARs) are tested by t-statistics suggested by Dodd & Warner 
(1983).  Statistical significance of CARs witching the event window is also tested with 
J-statistic suggested by Vaihekoski (2016).  
 
(6)  𝐽! = !"#! (!!,!!)!! (!!,!!) ~Ν (0,1) 
Where variance term 𝜎! is calculated as follows: 
 (7)     𝜎! 𝑡!, 𝑡! =  !! 
i=1
N
∑ 𝑡! − 𝑡! + 1 𝜎! 𝑡!, 𝑡!  
 
  = 𝑡! − 𝑡! + 1 𝜎!(𝑡!, 𝑡!) 
 
 
5.4. Regression model 
 
After the event study is conducted and the CARs for bidding banks have been 
calculated, next step is to identify the determinants of abnormal returns. Following 
Beitel et al. (2004) and Kyriazopoulos & Drymbetas (2015) regression analysis with 
array of explanatory variables is used to analyze the determinants of abnormal returns. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between ownership structure 
and post acquisition performance. This relationship is tested by cross-sectional 
regressions. All regression performed are simple OLS regressions. The dependent 
variable in regression is CAR (-1; +1) of the bidders. Independent variables include 
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different ownership variables and a set of control variables. The multivariate regression 
model is as specified as follows: 
 
(8) 𝐶𝐴𝑅 −1;  +1 =  𝛽! +  𝛽!CONCEN50+  𝛽!CONCEN70+ 𝛽!CONCEN90+𝛽!𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 +  𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸 +  𝛽!𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽!𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +  𝛽!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +  𝛽!𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑙 + 𝛽!"𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝜖  
 
Where, CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for bidding bank within the event 
window T =(-1; +1), 𝛽! is the regressions constant, 𝛽!CONCEN50 is a dummy variable 
for concentrated ownership at 50 % threshold, 𝛽!CONCEN70 is a dummy variable for 
concentrated ownership at 70 % threshold, 𝛽!CONCEN90 is a dummy variable for 
concentrated ownership at 90 % threshold, 𝛽!𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 is a dummy variable for state 
ownership, 𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸 is a dummy variable taking a of one if bidding bank held a stake 
in target prior acquisition, 𝛽!𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶  is a dummy variable for domestic 
acquisitions, 𝛽!𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  is a dummy variable for financial crisis, 𝛽!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸  is the 
logarithm of total assets, 𝛽!𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑙 is the logarithm of capital ratio determined as 
equity to assets ratio, , 𝛽!"𝑅𝑂𝐸 is the logarithm of return of equity ratio and 𝜖 is the 
error term of regression.  
 
All in all four different models are estimated. Every model uses a different ownership 
structure variable. Independent ownership structure variable in model 1 is 𝛽!CONCEN50, model 2 use 𝛽!CONCEN70, model 3 use 𝛽!CONCEN90 and finally 
model 4 use 𝛽!𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸. As mentioned above, dependent variable in regression is 3-day 
CAR, which has established as a reliable indicator of performance for acquiring firm 
around acquisition announcement (Brunner 2002; Beitel 2004).  
 
The impact of ownership concentration on post acquisition performance is measured 
using dummy variables with different cut-off points. When a large shareholder holds 
more than 50% of a company it not only dominates the company but also legally 
controls the firm (Yen & André 2007).  Ownership concentration should reduce agency 
costs and therefore lead to better post acquisition performance. To examine the impact 
of this ownership structure on post acquisition performance, a dummy variable at 50 % 
threshold is set. Along with the ownership concentration at 50 % threshold, dummy 
variables at 70 % and 90 % threshold are set to capture the impact of more extreme 
levels of ownership concentration. 
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Most of the previous studies on the impact of state ownership on banks lending or 
performance use dummy variables that takes a value of one if government held a certain 
percentage of banks equity (Sapienza 2004; Ianotta et al. 2007). CBR defines a bank 
state owned if more than 50% of banks equity belongs to the government. Following 
recent literature and definition of state ownership by CBR a dummy with a 50 percent 
threshold is used. The impact of state ownership on post acquisition performance is 
tested with a dummy variable taking a value of one if a government owns more than 
50% of the bidding banks equity. 
 
The model also includes deal specific variables that attempt to capture the impact of 
these variables on post acquisition performance. Previous research finds that domestic 
M&A results in higher abnormal returns than cross-border transactions (Beitel et al. 
2004; Campa & Hernando 2006; Nnadi & Tanna 2013). Following previous research 
the impact of geographic focus of the deal is measured with a dummy variable that takes 
a value of one if the M&A deal is domestic. One of the hypotheses of this thesis is that 
owning a stake of the target prior acquisition lead to better post acquisition 
performance. This relationship is tested with a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
if bidding bank owns a stake of the target prior acquisition. Previous literature on post 
acquisition performance finds also that abnormal returns may be different during and 
after the financial crisis, as Arik & Kutan (2015) conclude that abnormal returns are 
higher after financial crisis and Beltratti & Paladino (2013) find that during financial 
crisis investors assign much more uncertainty for the completion of M&A transactions, 
and reward successful deals with delayed abnormal returns. The impact of financial 
crisis on the abnormal returns is investigated with a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one if the acquisition was completed during financial crisis.  
 
Lastly the model includes bank specific control variables. Following previous literature 
on M&A success in banking sector (see e.g. Beitel et al. 2004; Fritsch et al. 2007; 
Kyriazopoulos 2016), control variables for bank size, capitalization and profitability are 
included in the model.  
 
 
5.5. Research limitations 
 
The use of Russian data is causing limitations in this research. Although the sample 
period is relatively long from 2005 to 2016 there is only 20 M&A transactions matching 
the sample criteria. Due to a low amount of data, empirical results should be treated 
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with caution. To increase the sample size, expanding the research to cover also other 
emerging markets was considered as well, but I decided to focus only on Russian 
markets due to the unique ownership structures and institutional settings of the Russian 
banking sector.  
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the empirical results of the study with regard to the 
research hypothesis. First the event study results for the whole sample and different 
subsamples are presented and discussed. Following that results of the cross-sectional 
regression analysis on the determinants of abnormal returns are presented.  
 
 
6.1. Event study results  
 
Table 3 below presents the daily average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the entire sample of 20 Russian banking M&A. 
Results are shown for the 21-day event window. Findings of the event study indicate 
modest positive impact for bidding banks on average, as AARs are positive around the 
announcement date. In specific AAR is 0,72% on the announcement date and 1,07% 
one day after the announcement. However, these results are not statistically significant 
at any conventional level. When looking at the AARs during the 21-day event window 
negative and statistically significant returns are found in days (-10) and (-7). In specific 
AAR for day (-10) is -1,76% and in day (-7) AAR is -1,50%. These results are 
statistically significant at 10% level. These results suggest that there may have been 
information leakages prior the acquisition announcement, and investors may have 
shifted their funds from bidders to targets.  
 
CAAR for the whole 21-day event window is negative, but not statistically significant. 
In specific CAAR for the 21-day event window is -1,81%. Three day CAAR for event 
window (-1, +1) is moderately positive at 2,31% suggesting that bidding banks earn 
positive abnormal returns around announcement date. However, these results are not 
statistically different from zero. When looking at CAARs for various event windows 
prior and after the after the announcement date, I did not find any statistical significant 
abnormal returns. 
 
The lack of statistically significant abnormal returns is consistent with the previous 
findings of Beltratti & Paladino (2013) and Kyriazopoulos & Drymbetas (2015) who 
find non-significant abnormal returns for bidding banks. These results suggest that 
M&A fails to create value for bidding banks. In light of these findings hypothesis one 
that M&A cause negative abnormal returns for bidding bank’s cannot be accepted, as 
abnormal returns are positive and statistically not different from zero.  
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Table 3. Event study results for the whole sample.  
Table reports average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for 
bidding banks around the M&A announcement. N=20. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 below presents the event study results for domestic and cross-border M&A 
transactions. The sample is split based on the geographic scope of the deal. On the left 
hand side of the table AARs and CAARs following domestic acquisitions are shown. 
AARs and CAARs following cross-border M&A transactions are shown on the right 
hand side of the table. Looking at the abnormal returns around the announcement date 
domestic M&A seem to lead to higher abnormal returns, as 3-day CAAR (-1, +1) is 
3,14% following domestic M&A announcements, whereas 3-day CAAR following 
cross-border transactions is more moderate at 0,88%. However, both of these returns are 
t AAR T-Stat	for	AAR p-value CAAR T-stat	for	CAAR p-value
-10 -1,76%* -1,88 0,06 -1,76% -0,86 0,39
-9 1,61% 1,47 0,14 -0,15% -0,07 0,94
-8 -0,19% -0,46 0,65 -0,34% -0,17 0,87
-7 -1,50%* -1,70 0,09 -1,84% -0,90 0,37
-6 0,00% 0,01 0,99 -1,84% -0,90 0,37
-5 0,01% 0,04 0,97 -1,83% -0,89 0,37
-4 -0,88% -0,94 0,35 -2,71% -1,32 0,19
-3 -0,57% -0,71 0,48 -3,27% -1,60 0,11
-2 0,80% 1,06 0,29 -2,47% -1,21 0,23
-1 0,52% 0,30 0,77 -1,95% -0,95 0,34
0 0,72% 1,00 0,32 -1,23% -0,60 0,55
1 1,07% 0,93 0,35 -0,16% -0,08 0,94
2 -0,23% -1,01 0,31 -0,39% -0,19 0,85
3 -0,79% -0,90 0,37 -1,18% -0,58 0,56
4 0,11% 0,30 0,77 -1,07% -0,53 0,60
5 0,42% 0,63 0,53 -0,65% -0,32 0,75
6 -0,16% -0,47 0,64 -0,82% -0,40 0,69
7 0,04% 0,09 0,93 -0,78% -0,38 0,70
8 -1,03% -1,05 0,29 -1,82% -0,89 0,37
9 -0,40% -1,65 0,10 -2,22% -1,08 0,28
10 0,40% 1,08 0,28 -1,81% -0,89 0,38
[t1,t2] [-10,-1] [-5,-1] [-3,+3] [-1,+1] [0,+1] [+1,+5] [+1,+10]
CAAR -1,95% -0,11% 1,53% 2,31% 1,78% 0,58% -0,58%
J1 -0,64 -0,05 0,60 1,38 1,31 0,27 -0,19
p-value 0,52 0,96 0,55 0,17 0,19 0,79 0,85
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statistically insignificant. Similarly than for the whole sample, abnormal returns in days 
(-10) and (-7) are negative and statistically significant for domestic M&A transactions.  
 
 
Table 4. Event study results for domestic and cross-border M&A. 
Table reports average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for 
bidding banks following domestic and cross-border M&A. Domestic M&A N=11 cross-border M&A 
N=9. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Looking at the post event window of (+1, +5) abnormal returns seems to be different for 
domestic and cross-border M&A. In specific CAAR (+1, +5) is -1,53% for domestic 
M&A and 3,15% for cross-border transactions. The latter bears statistical significance at 
5% level, indicating that markets reward cross-border M&A transactions with delayed 
abnormal returns. Higher abnormal returns following cross-border M&A, indicates that 
in emerging Russian markets shareholders view entry to foreign banking markets as a 
t AAR T-Stat	for	AAR CAAR AAR T-Stat	for	AAR CAAR
-10 -2,30%* -1,669 -2,30% -1,10% -1,392 -1,10%
-9 2,12% 1,300 -0,18% 0,98% 1,100 -0,11%
-8 -0,09% -0,405 -0,27% -0,32% -0,365 -0,43%
-7 -2,43%* -1,797 -2,70% -0,37% -1,048 -0,80%
-6 0,44% 1,358 -2,26% -0,53% -0,813 -1,33%
-5 -0,37% -1,021 -2,63% 0,48% 1,418 -0,85%
-4 0,16% 0,532 -2,47% -2,14% -1,089 -3,00%
-3 -1,20% -1,056 -3,67% 0,20% 0,252 -2,80%
-2 1,17% 0,985 -2,50% 0,36% 0,901 -2,43%
-1 2,50% 1,226 0,00% -1,90% -0,767 -4,33%
0 0,58% 0,539 0,58% 0,88% 1,559 -3,45%
1 0,05% 0,253 0,64% 2,31% 0,938 -1,14%
2 -0,04% -0,631 0,59% -0,47% -0,943 -1,60%
3 -1,96% -1,563 -1,37% 0,65% 1,092 -0,95%
4 0,02% 0,039 -1,35% 0,22% 0,386 -0,74%
5 0,41% 0,391 -0,94% 0,43% 1,146 -0,30%
6 -0,50% -1,540 -1,44% 0,25% 0,412 -0,06%
7 0,34% 0,694 -1,10% -0,33% -0,553 -0,39%
8 -1,95%* -1,906 -3,05% 0,08% 0,050 -0,31%
9 -0,38% -1,275 -3,43% -0,42% -1,222 -0,72%
10 0,50% 1,189 -2,94% 0,28% 0,478 -0,44%
[t1,t2] CAAR J1 [t1,t2] CAAR J1
[-10,-1] 0,00% 0,00 [-10,-1] -4,33% -0,936
[-5,-1] 2,26% 0,75 [-5,-1] -3,00% -0,916
[-3,+3] 1,10% 0,31 [-3,+3] 1,30% 0,255
[-1,+1] 3,14% 1,35 [-1,+1] 0,88% 0,604
[0,+1] 0,63% 0,33 [0,+1] 3,19% 1,542
[+1,+5] -1,53% -0,51 [+1,+5] 3,15%** 2,147
[+1,+10] -3,52% -0,83 [+1,+10] 3,01% 0,649
Domestic	M&A Cross-border	M&A
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positive development. In general, CAARs seems to be positive within pre-event 
windows of (-10, +1) and (-5, +1), and negative within post-event windows of (+1, +5) 
and (+1, +10) for domestic M&A transactions. Abnormal returns following the cross-
border transactions are opposite, as CAARs are negative during the same pre-event 
windows and positive during the same post-event windows. Nevertheless, the evidence 
for M&A value creation is a bit inconclusive for both domestic and cross-border M&A 
transactions, as CAARs for various pre- and post-event windows are statistically not 
different from zero with the exception of CAAR (+1, +5) for cross-border M&A.  
 
Based on these findings hypothesis two that domestic M&A lead to higher abnormal 
returns cannot be accepted. Although, the abnormal returns following domestic M&A 
during the event window of (-1, +1) are higher than abnormal returns following cross-
border M&A, these returns are not statistically different from zero. The results for value 
creation following domestic and cross-border M&A are mostly in line with the results 
of the entire sample, suggesting that bidding banks earn non-significant abnormal 
returns following M&A announcements.  
 
Table 5 presents the event study results for state-owned and privately held banks. On 
the left hand side of the table AARs and CAARs following M&A by the state-owned 
banks are shown. AARs and CAARs following M&A transactions by privately owned 
banks are shown on the right hand side of the table. AAR at the announcement day is 
1,08% for state-owned banks and -0,74% for privately owned banks. However, these 
returns are statistically insignificant. Similarly, than for the entire sample and AARs for 
days (-10) and (-7) are negative and statistically significant for state-owned banks.  
 
Looking at the CAARs during the 3-day window around the M&A announcement, 
positive and statistically significant abnormal return of 6,45% is found for the 
subsample of privately owned banks. In contrast 3-day CAAR for state-owned banks is 
much moderate at 1,27% and statistically insignificant. In addition CAAR for the event 
window (-5, -1) is 7,44% and statistically significant at 10 percent level for the 
subsample of privately owned banks. Looking at the CAARs for the whole 21-day event 
window CAAR for the state-owned banks is -3,60%, whereas CAAR for the privately 
owned banks is 5,34%. However, CAARs for the 21-day event window are statistically 
insignificant. These results suggest that M&A by privately owned Russian banks creates 
value for shareholders of the bidding banks. However, the sample size for M&A for the 
privately owned banks is relatively small at four events. Because of the small sample 
size these results should be treated with caution.   
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Based on the evidence presented in table 5 hypothesis three that state ownership has a 
positive impact on post acquisition performance cannot be accepted. As a matter of fact, 
the situation seems to be the exact opposite, as abnormal returns are higher and 
statistically significant for private ownership subsample. Findings on the positive 
relation between private ownership and post acquisition performance are opposite with 
the findings of Du & Boateng (2014) who find that state ownership has a positive 
impact on the post acquisition performance in China. Findings of the non-significant  
 
Altogether, my event study findings on the abnormal returns for the bidding banks are 
mostly in line with the previous research of Beltratti & Paladino (2013) and 
Kyriazopoulos & Drymbetas (2015), as bidding banks seems to earn non-significant 
abnormal returns. Bit surprisingly and opposite of hypothesis one abnormal returns 
around announcement date are mostly positive for bidding banks. However, without a 
few exceptions these returns are statistically insignificant. Most interesting findings of 
the event study are positive and statistically significant abnormal returns following 
cross-border M&A within the event window (+1, +5) and the positive and significant 
abnormal returns for privately owned banks within event windows (-5, -1) and (-1, +1). 
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Table 5. Event study resulst for state-owned and privately held banks. 
Table reports average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for 
bidding banks following M&A. State-owned N=16 privately held N=4. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
	
 
 
6.2. Regression results  
 
Next step in empirical analysis is the multivariate regression analysis. Basic OLS 
regressions are performed to investigate the relationship between ownership structure 
and post acquisition performance. Factors explaining M&A success are studied by 
including array of explanatory variables. Dependent variable in all regression is 3-day 
t AAR T-Stat	for	AAR CAAR AAR T-Stat	for	AAR CAAR
-10 -2,22%* -1,94 -2,22% 0,07% 0,60 0,07%
-9 1,63% 1,20 -0,59% 1,54% 1,66 1,62%
-8 -0,15% -0,30 -0,74% -0,36% -0,67 1,26%
-7 -1,85%* -1,70 -2,59% -0,13% -0,46 1,13%
-6 -0,07% -0,15 -2,65% 0,29% 0,65 1,41%
-5 0,32% 1,45 -2,34% -1,20% -1,31 0,21%
-4 -1,29% -1,14 -3,63% 0,77% 0,98 0,99%
-3 -0,88% -0,91 -4,51%** 0,67% 0,68 1,65%
-2 1,03% 1,09 -3,48% -0,08% -0,28 1,58%
-1 -1,17% -0,83 -4,65%** 7,28% 1,31 8,85%**
0 1,08% 1,30 -3,57% -0,74% -0,74 8,11%**
1 1,36% 0,96 -2,21% -0,09% -0,16 8,03%**
2 -0,33% -1,17 -2,54% 0,16%*** 2,84 8,19%**
3 -0,24% -0,28 -2,78% -2,99% -1,19 5,20%
4 -0,07% -0,19 -2,84% 0,80% 0,72 6,00%
5 0,48% 0,58 -2,36% 0,16% 0,67 6,17%
6 0,07% 0,19 -2,29% -1,08% -1,23 5,08%
7 -0,01%* -0,03 -2,31% 0,24% 0,26 5,32%
8 -1,19% -0,98 -3,49% -0,43% -0,54 4,89%
9 -0,62%** -2,31 -4,11%* 0,48%* 1,87 5,38%
10 0,51% 1,15 -3,60% -0,03% -0,07 5,34%
[t1,t2] CAAR J1 [t1,t2] CAAR J1
[-10,-1] -4,65% 0,17 [-10,-1] 8,85% 1,48
[-5,-1] -1,99% 0,41 [-5,-1] 7,44%* 1,75
[-3,+3] 0,85% 0,83 [-3,+3] 4,22% 0,84
[-1,+1] 1,27% 0,49 [-1,+1] 6,45%* 1,96
[0,+1] 2,44% 0,11 [0,+1] -0,83% -0,31
[+1,+5] 1,21% 0,61 [+1,+5] -1,95% -0,46
[+1,+10] -0,04% 0,99 [+1,+10] -2,77% -0,46
State-owned Privately	held
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CAR around the announcement date (-1, +1).  CAR is chosen as a dependent variable 
because it is direct measure of shareholder value and investors future prospects. In 
addition, it is widely used in prior empirical research, and has established as a reliable 
indicator of performance for acquiring firm around M&A announcement (Brunner 
2002; Beitel 2004). Relatively short event window should capture the immediate 
information content of M&A announcement, and reduce the changes that the returns are 
affect by other overlapping events.  
 
Independent variables include different ownership structure variables and a set of 
control variables. Regression model is specified by equation eight. Autocorrelation is 
controlled by Durbin-Watson statistic and Lagrange multiplier tests, which show that 
the models are not suffering on autocorrelation problems. All in all, four models are 
estimated. Separate models are estimated because ownership structure variables are 
defined with different thresholds of ownership concentration, and estimating the model 
with all variables at same time would cause multicollinearity problems. Regression 
results are shown in table 6. 
 
Regression result on the relationship between state ownership and post acquisition 
performance are in line with my event study results, as coefficient for state ownership is 
statistically insignificant. Based on the combined results from the event study and 
regression model four, hypothesis four that state ownership has a positive impact on 
post acquisition performance cannot be accepted. Finding of insignificant relationship 
between state ownership and post acquisition performance, is different from the 
findings of Du & Boateng (2014) who find that state ownership has positive impact on 
post acquisition performance. In light of these findings Chinese and Russian markets 
seem to be different. 
 
Coefficient for variable INSIDE is positive and statistically significant in all models 
expect model 1. This finding illustrates that prior ownership of the target bank has 
positive impact on post acquisition performance. In light of these findings hypothesis 
five that owning a stake of the target prior M&A announcement increase post 
acquisition performance is accepted. This finding is in line with the previous findings of 
Ben-Amar & André (2006).  
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Table 6. Regression results.	
Table reports estimates of equation (8). The dependent variable in all regression is CAR (-1; +1) of the 
bidders. Model (1) is the regression for the relationship between ownership concentration at 50 percent 
level and cumulative abnormal return, model (2) for the 70 percent level, model (3) for the 90 percent 
level and model (4) for the state ownership. Concentrated 50 is a dummy variable for concentrated 
ownership at 50 % threshold, Concentrated 70 is a dummy variable for concentrated ownership at 70 % 
threshold, Concentrated 90 is a dummy variable for concentrated ownership at 90 % threshold, 
State_owned is a dummy variable for state ownership, Inside is a dummy variable taking a of one if 
bidding bank held a stake in target prior acquisition, Domestic is a dummy variable for domestic 
acquisitions, Crisis is a dummy variable for financial crisis, Size is the logarithm of total assets of the 
bidding bank,  Capital is the logarithm of the capital ratio of the bidding bank determined as equity to 
assets ratio, Roe is the logarithm of return of equity ratio of the bidding bank. T-statistics are on 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Model	1 Model	2 Model	3 Model	4
Dependent	variable: CAR	[-1,+1]
Constant -0,093 -0,240 -0,075 -0,069
(-0,273) (-0,819) (-0,220) (-0,186)
Concentrated	50 0,026
0,439
Concentrated	70 -0,072
(-1,754)
Concentrated	90 -0,027
(-0,547)
State_owned 0,044
(0,703)
Inside 0,060 0,127** 0,076* 0,072*
(1,612) (2,805) (2,081) (2,038)
Domestic -0,026 -0,012 -0,035 -0,029
(-0,924) (-0,444) (-1,149) (-1,047)
Crisis 0,027 0,086* 0,041 0,017
(0,681) (2,053) (1,173) (0,293)
Size -0,028* -0,023** -0,030* -0,036
(-1,986) (-2,218) (-1,922) (-1,109)
Capital 0,236** 0,270** 0,256** 0,288*
(2,375) (2,969) (2,474) (1,796)
Roe 0,014 0,015* 0,016* 0,015
(1,618) (1,906) (1,851) (1,721)
Number	of	observations 20 20 20 20
R-Squared 0,580 0,660 0,584 0,578
F-statistic 2,366* 3,331** 2,402* 2,353*
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Coefficient for domestic M&A transactions is negative and insignificant in all models, 
indicating that domestic M&A does not lead to better post acquisition performance than 
cross-border M&A. This finding is consistent with my event study findings on the 
profitability of domestic M&A. Bit surprisingly coefficient for dummy variable CRISIS 
is positive in all models. However, it is statistically significant only in model two. This 
finding provides weak evidence that abnormal returns are higher during financial crisis. 
In light of these findings hypothesis six that abnormal returns are lower during financial 
crisis cannot be accepted. Indeed abnormal returns seem to be higher during financial 
crisis. However, since the relationship is statistically significant only in model one I 
cannot conclude that abnormal returns are different during financial crisis.  
 
Size of the acquiring bank seems to have a negative impact on post acquisition 
performance. Negative and statistically significant coefficients are found in all models 
except model 4. Finding of negative relation between the size of bidding banks and post 
acquisition performance is in line with the findings of Kyriazopoulos & Drymbetas 
(2015) who also find small negative impact between the size of the acquirer and post 
acquisition performance. Negative relationship between size and post acquisition 
performance is also related to Roll’s (1986) hubris theory, as management in large 
companies may be more prone to suffer from hubris and overestimate the possible 
synergies arising from M&A transactions.  
 
Regression results show also that capital ratio and return of equity of acquiring bank 
have a positive impact on post acquisition performance. Coefficient for capital ratio is 
positive and statistically significant in all of the estimated models. This finding indicates 
that market values transactions of highly capitalized banks. Statistically significant 
impact of return of equity is detected in models two and three. Positive relationship 
between ROE and post acquisition performance indicates that profitable banks make 
better acquisitions.  
 
All in all, my regression results show that ownership structure does not have an impact 
on post acquisition performance, and that prior ownership of the target is positively 
associated with post acquisition performance. Large banks tend to make worse 
acquisitions. In addition, bank capitalization and profitability are positively related to 
post acquisition performance.    
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate profitability of banking M&A in Russia and 
the relationship between ownership structure and post acquisition performance. More 
precisely, this thesis investigates whether ownership concentration, state ownership and 
prior ownership of the target have impact on post acquisition performance. Empirical 
approach of this thesis is two-staged, at first abnormal returns following M&A 
announcements are calculated using event study methodology, following that these 
returns are tested with OLS regressions to identify the factors explaining M&A success.  
 
Previous research on the M&A success focuses mainly on measuring daily returns 
around the announcement date. General conclusion of the previous research is that 
abnormal returns following acquisition announcements date are zero or negative for 
acquirers and positive for targets (Spyrou & Siougle 2010; Campa & Hernando 2006). 
In addition, most of the previous banking studies find that bidding banks earn 
insignificant abnormal returns following M&A announcements (Beltratti & Paladino 
2013; Kyriazopoulos & Drymbetas 2015). Since majority of previous studies have 
focused on U.S. and Western Europe markets, M&A research in emerging markets is 
still limited. This study aims to fill the research gap by focusing on developing Russian 
banking markets. This research is topical due to recent developments in the Russian 
banking sector. Moreover, the unique ownership structure of the Russian banks create 
interesting setting to study the impact of ownership concentration on post acquisition 
performance 
 
A sample of 20 Russian banking M&A between the years 2005 and 2013 are studied. 
Six hypotheses are formulated to answer the research questions on the value creation of 
Russian banking M&A. As stated before, these six hypotheses are tested with event 
study and OLS regressions. Event study results for the whole sample are in line with the 
previous banking studies, indicating that bidding banks earn statistically insignificant 
returns around the announcement date. This finding indicates that M&A fails to create 
value for bidding banks in Russia. 
 
One object of this study is to investigate whether geographical scope of the M&A 
transaction has an impact on post acquisition performance. For that reason, sample is 
split based on the geographic scope of the transaction. Comparing the abnormal returns 
between domestic and cross-border M&A, the results show that cross-border M&A lead 
to positive and statistically significant abnormal returns within event window (+1, +5). 
 
 
  
 
64 
This finding indicates that in developing Russian banking markets investors see entry to 
foreign banking markets as a positive development. Interesting results emerge when 
comparing the event study results between state-owned and privately held banks. 
CAAR for privately held banks within the event window (-1, +1) is 6,45% and bears 
statistical significance at 5% level. CAAR for state-owned banks is statistically 
insignificant. These results show that private ownership has positive impact on post 
acquisition performance. However, sample size for privately owned banks is relatively 
small, and therefore these results should be treated with caution.  
 
The results from the cross-sectional regression analysis show that ownership 
concentration does not have an impact on post acquisition performance in Russian 
banking sector. All the ownership concentration variables fail to explain any variation in 
CAR. Similarly, state ownership does not have any impact on post acquisition 
performance. Prior ownership of the target is the only ownership structure variable that 
is found to have a positive impact on post acquisition performance. Finally, bank 
specific control variables seem to explain part of the variation in CAR. Size of the 
acquiring bank has negative impact on post acquisition performance. In contrast, 
capitalization and profitability of acquiring bank have positive impact on post 
acquisition performance. 
 
The use of Russian data is causing limitations to the research. Although the sample 
period is relatively long from 2005 to 2016 there are only 20 M&A transactions 
matching the sample criteria. Due to the low amount of data, empirical results should be 
treated with caution. In addition, free floats are usually relatively small in Russian stock 
markets. Due to the low float, impact of M&A announcements may be only partially 
reflected on the stock prices. Considering the relatively small amount of M&A by 
publicly traded banks in Russia, further research could focus on changes in accounting 
measures following M&A. For example, further research could study the effect of 
M&A on bank lending and operational cash flows. 
 
In conclusion, I find that ownership structures explain only a small part of the post 
acquisition performance in Russian banking sector. Moreover, I find that cross-border 
transactions and acquisitions of privately held banks are associated with positive and 
statistically significant abnormal returns. Finally, bank specific variables explain part of 
the variation in cumulative abnormal returns. 
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APPENDIX 1. Summary of transactions. 
 
 
 
 
  Date
Announced
Acquiror Name Target Name % of 
shares 
acquired
% of shares 
owned after 
transaction
29/08/05 Sberbank Rossii JSC BKI Infokredit 50,00 50,00
24/07/06 Sberbank Rossii Texakabank JSC 80,00 80,00
27/12/06 Sberbank Rossii Texakabank JSC 20,00 100,00
09/12/08 Bank VTB AF Bank 51,00 51,00
10/12/09 Sberbank Rossii BPS Bank 93,27 93,27
16/12/09 Bank VTB AKB Rosbank 19,28 19,28
18/02/10 AKB Rosbank Rusfinans Bank 100,00 100,00
05/07/10 Bank VTB TransKreditBank 43,20 43,20
24/11/10 Bank VTB AKB Bank Moskvy 46,48 46,48
11/01/11 Bank Sankt-Petersburg AKB Zarech'e 20,06 20,06
28/04/11 Bank VTB TransKreditBank 29,39 72,89
31/08/11 Sberbank Rossii VBI 100,00 100,00
20/10/11 URALSIB KB BNP Pariba Vostok-Retail lo 100,00 100,00
23/12/11 Sberbank Rossii SLB Commercial Bank AG 99,15 99,15
14/02/12 Bank VTB TransCreditBank 12,76 77,79
04/05/12 Sberbank Rossii KB BNP Pariba Vostok 70,00 70,00
08/06/12 Sberbank Rossii Denizbank AS 99,85 99,85
16/05/13 Bank VTB Bank Moskvy Belgrad 100,00 100,00
23/12/13 URALSIB Bashprombank 49,99 99,99
26/12/13 Bank Sankt-Petersburg IKB YEVROPEYSKIY 100,00 100,00
